Incentive Mechanisms of Altruistic Behavior With Social Preference Introduced and the Effects Comparison

Ping ZHANG, Yang ZHANG, Hongyu GUAN

Abstract


Under the assumption of rational person, the provision of altruistic behavior will eventually be exhausted. However, in reality, some people still would rather sacrifice their own interests to help others. This paper introduces altruistic social preference into utility function, researches on how to push the upgrade of altruistic behavior in the society through designing the incentive mechanism while realizing the maximum of individual interest and social welfare. This paper divides the individuals into individuals with high, middle and low altruistic levels and analyzes the effects of different incentive mechanisms on these three kinds of individuals. Finally, this paper comes to the comparative analysis on the policy effects by combining the effects of the proportion of the individuals with different altruistic levels in the group on the aggregate provision of altruistic behavior.


Keywords


Altruistic behavior; Social preference; Incentive mechanism

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/7572

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