A Study of Law-Based Chinese Petition System From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Model

Chaoqiang XIE, Jin CHEN, Wenyuan LÜ

Abstract


Petition system (named Xinfang in Chinese) is a typical Chinese system for citizens to express opinions and seek non-lawsuit remedies. It was originally positioned with the emphasis on expression of public opinions, but the general public expect more on its rights relief function. Over the recent 30 years, China’s economy entered into a period of high-speed development, and the redressal of social interest structure aggregated the conflicts of functional position of petition, which has surged the volume of petition letters and visits. The frequent occurrence of social contradictions resulting from blockage of petitions has seriously impaired social stability. Hence, it is pressing to readjust the functional position of petition and guide the system onto the legal track. In this paper, theoretical analysis is made over the strategy selection and dynamic game of both players of petition during the interaction process by building an evolutionary game model, to conclude an ideal state of stable equilibrium. With the theory base, suggestions are proposed on guiding petition onto the legal track.


Keywords


Petition system; Law-based petition; Petition assessment; Irregular petition; Evolutionary game

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/7518

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