An Assessment of the Motivations for the 2011 Nato Intervention in Libya and Its Implications for Africa

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Abstract

This paper bears out of a documentary assessment of the prime motivations for the speedy enforcement of United Nations' Resolution 1973 and consequent enforcement of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) norm on Libya. The study discovers that the intervention was not driven by humanitarian concerns, but was impelled by the national interests, geo-strategic considerations of the intervening nations especially the United States and France. Hence, the intervention though seemingly genuine was a vindictive attempt at regime change especially in the light of its selective character as some other actors guilty of grave human rights abuses of which the Qathafi regime was accused were selectively left out. The study further highlights the flagrant abuse of the Resolution 1973 in the marginalisation of the humanitarian component of the mission, as well as the prolongation of the assault within which infantry and massive armed support were offered to the rebels all of which veritably impacts on the future application of the R2P norm. The study thus submits that realist "self-help" factors were of primary significance in the intervention and recommends that military units belonging to hegemonic powers; in particular, the United States, France and Britain must not be allowed to participate in future interventions in the light of the chaotic aftermath of previous interventions as evident in Iraq and Libya to mention but two.

Key words: R2P; humanitarian intervention; realism; Libya

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the tragic events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s to which the UN Security Council failed to respond timely and decisively, there have been efforts to further circumscribe the principle of state sovereignty to justify foreign intervention when genocidal events or massive violations of human rights take place within a country (Thakur, 2011).

It was in response to these events that the Canadian government took initiatives to establish the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 which called for a profound change to the way in which the world responded to the problem of mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2011).

Indeed the violence that erupted in these countries invoked a sense moral duty on the international community to intervene and to prevent possible massacre in the future (Carpenter, 2011); yet, the fact that the Rwandan genocide was essentially a war between France and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) all due from the French phobia of losing a Franco-phone satellite to the Anglophone minded RPF (BBC News, 2010) has rarely been made clear; just as we were rarely informed that Commander Roméo Dallaire was variously rebuffed when he requested authorisation to seize massive cache of weapons that was eventually used for the genocide and that the United Nations (UN) was kept out from intervening in the genocide by a French veto in the Security Council which also had the support the United

States (US) and the United Kingdom (Kuperman, 2001; Stanton, 2012; Willum, 1999; Dallaire, 1999, 2005).

Like the belated UN efforts at saving lives in Rwanda, it was when the originally authorised "protection of civilians" in Libya turned out to a displacement of a people and destruction of their social and economic infrastructure that the Brazilian mantra of "responsibility while protecting" (RWP) entered the lexicon of humanitarian intervention of which Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier (2016) subsume that while there may be disagreements about the adoption of RWP the concept has raised questions that will not go away as they are now part and parcel of humanitarian intervention's discourse.

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The US led NATO intervention in Libya has ushered in a plethora of interpretations in numerous debates and discourses but considerations focused squarely on the underlying motivations for the intervention has not been adequately exhausted within the literature. To this end, this study aims to ascertain the prime motivations for NATO intervention in Libya; whether they stem from genuine humanitarian motives or whether "self-help" otherwise realist or Realpolitik motives are of primary significance for the intervention.

The significance of the study bears especially on the aftermath of the intervention on global governance and the future of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) norm given that post-Qathafi Libya has turned out with perhaps more violence and continued chaos than post-Saddam Hussein's Iraq especially tainting the future of the newly evolved R2P.

2. BACKGROUND OF STUDY

The Libyan conflict and consequent NATO intervention in 2011 was part of the broader "Arab Spring" movement, which began on 17 December, 2010 when a fruit and vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in protest against bureaucratic indifference and state corruption in Tunisia. This act provoked widespread anti-government protests, leading then President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to abscond into exile. Weeks later and inspired by the Tunisian experience, mass demonstrations got underway with similar protests erupting in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain (Ibrahim, Liman, & Okoroafor, 2014; Ardıc, 2012; Solomon, 2014).

For Libya protests began 15 February, 2011 leading to clashes with security forces. The protests eventually escalated into an insurrection that spread across the country, with rebels establishing a mock alternative government (Keenan, 2011; Cockburn, 2011).

A similar intervention in Syria did not occur, in spite of the widespread human rights violations and grave human suffering all leading to widespread reactions isolating contributors to the literature into a pro-NATO intervention group and those against the intervention.

On the whole, the Libyan crisis of 2011 has raised issues on the choice of means in protecting civilians with particular reference to the notion of neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian action (Pommier, 2011).

The study however would consider a thorough analysis of landmark reports on the intervention to procure an objective stance with particular respect to ascertaining the prime motivations for the intervention other than taking sides with either side of the debate. This objective stance would be further concretised with objective stance with reports from previous NATO interventions to obtain an unblemished picture of the intervention in Libya which at this point remains unclear.

To this end, background information of the core variables of the study is provided below to establish the context within which the study is premised.

2.1 Overview of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in 1949 by the United States (US) and a couple of European nations to ensure transatlantic security after World War II and to act as counterweight to Soviet socialist infiltrations in Europe and ultimately serve as Europe's insurance policy in the event of an attack (Gordon, 2013).

The cornerstone of NATO is Article 5 of its treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (NATO, 1949).

While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) renamed the World Trade Organization in 1995 formalised capitalist trade against a Soviet socialist system beginning in 1948, NATO acted as a balance in the security sector against the Soviet military alliance called Warsaw Pact. However, following the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO transitioned from being a strictly defensive organisation to a broad-based security organisation (Sundarajan, 2012).

In the light of this shift, NATO is forced to reassess its collective goals and purposes within the context of ongoing conflicts in the world, shrinking budgets, and changing the nature of warfare. As observable in the wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, NATO is only able to secure sustainable peace through development activities after the combat phase. These development activities include capacity-building, state-making, implementing good governance projects, building infrastructure and training local police. This security-development nexus requires NATO to undertake peacekeeping in order to ensure that a region does not re-erupt into conflict (Sundarajan, 2012).

With the changing nature of warfare as manifested in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the attacks of September 11th, NATO

transformed itself into an alliance with wide-ranging peacekeeping missions outside of its own territorial area, all in order to ensure the political and economic security of its members (Labott, 2010).

Whereas, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the purpose for which NATO was created[1] as democratic values have been assumed to conquer communism; but the trans-Atlantic alliance is not content in securing those values only within its area of responsibility. According to former NATO Secretary General Robertson, the alliance's new mission was "to build the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the future, where all states share peace and democracy, and uphold basic human rights" (Moore, 2007).

For proponents of liberal interventionism NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, is a testament to how far the alliance has transitioned to integrate humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping into its mission. The alliance is thus presumed to have fought on behalf of democratic principles and provided support and protection for Libyan nationals fighting for independence from an autocratic ruler (Sundarajan, 2012; Gertler, 2011; Pattison, 2011).

Proponents of liberal interventionism also believe that the success in Libya showed the international community the continuing relevance of NATO and may serve as a model of collective action and peacekeeping in the future (Sundarajan, 2012).

From yet another angle the US led NATO intervention in Libya followed the lead of European allies and other Arab partners. To the international community, this was a major change from the Bush administration's approach to the war in Iraq and reduced global concerns about the application of US military power, and was a political win for the US and its allies (Gertler, 2011).

2.2 Overview of the Concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

State sovereignty has long been a fixed and attribute of states since the conception of the current international system following the Peace of Westphalia (1648). As such, states have recognised the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as an essential element of international relations (Jackson, 1999; Lake, 2003; Doli & Korenica, 2009).

Be that as it may, the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime during World War II (WWII) shocked the conscience of the world, and the once inviolable concept of sovereignty began to erode building in-roads into the idea that international law should protect the rights of individuals, and not solely the rights of nations. This idea also led to a proliferation of international human rights treaties which guaranteed individuals a wide variety of rights, including life, liberty and freedom of speech (Magnuson, 2010, p.255).

To this end, the UN began the reconsideration of the status of sovereignty with the adoption of the Genocide Convention on 9 December 1948, which opened the door to subordinating traditional sovereignty to the bare-minimum standard of preventing and averting genocide (Arbour, 2008).

With the massive human rights abuses witnessed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the internationally accepted consensus surrounding the non-interference principle further changed. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), arose to further resolve the tension between the competing claims of sovereignty and human rights by building a new consensus around the principles that should govern the protection of endangered people all leading to the adoption of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) principle by the United Nations' General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit (Arbour, 2008).

According to Evans and Sahnoun (2002) the R2P is a demand on the international community to intervene in places where entire communities and peoples are threatened by genocide, where women are threatened by mass rape, and where death and starvation threaten to destroy an entire generation.

In such cases, the international community, in the form of international and regional organisations, may make a commitment to protect civilians when the latter's own state does not have the will or resources to do so. The UN incorporated this norm in the 2005 World Summit and then passed UN Security Council Resolution 1674 in April 2006 to that effect (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002).

Paragraph 139 of the World Summit document explicitly states as follows:

> We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council […] should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications.

While the UN Security Council is the primary international framework by which to invoke the authority of R2P, the Council includes two permanent members (Russia and China) with values that differ from American and NATO ideals of freedom and democracy (Daalder & Kagan, 2007).

However, the human rights atrocities perpetrated by regimes upon its own people in Nazi Germany, communist China under Mao, Cambodia under Pol Pot, the Rwandan Genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo are assumed to present more than sufficient justification for acknowledging the failures of the static nature of sovereignty based upon Westphalian precepts (Benjamin, 2010).

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[1] NATO was created as an alliance of democratic nations to offset communism in Europe.

Be that as it may, humanitarian justifications for intervention emerged in the 1970s in the cases of India in East Pakistan (1971), Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978) and Tanzania in Uganda (1979). These acts serve as reminders that traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty must not form the basis of inter-state conduct, as both internal and external legitimacy, manifested as a notion of responsibilities that the state owes its population and to the international community (Arbour, 2008; Benjamin, 2010).

As the international community moved away from a bipolar East/West Cold War footing in the 1990s, international consensus around the absoluteness of non-interference as an inherent characteristic of sovereignty began to shift. Since the emergence of American hegemony at the end of the Cold War, the UN has been able to deploy humanitarian interventions, under the unipolar "leadership" of the US. Within the scope of increasingly destabilising intra-state conflicts including the post-cold war genocides, civil wars, and subsequent UN interventions witnessed in Bosnia (1992-94), Somalia (1992-95), Rwanda (1994-95), Haiti (1994), East Timor (1999-2002) and the most recent Libyan intervention in 2011 (Stein, 2004; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Pommier, 2011).

2.3 United Nations' Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973

The Libyan conflict and consequent NATO intervention of 2011 was part of the broader "Arab Spring" movement, which began on 17 December, 2010 when a fruit and vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in protest against bureaucratic indifference and corruption in Tunisia This act provoked widespread anti-government protests, leading then President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to flee into exile; weeks later and inspired by the Tunisian experience, mass demonstrations got underway with similar protests erupting in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain (Ibrahim, Liman, & Okoroafor, 2014).

2.3.1 Resolution 1970 (UNSC/res/1970)

For Libya protests began 15 February, 2011 when an estimated two hundred people gathered in front of the police headquarters in Benghazi demanding the release of a well-known human rights lawyer. A number of people were injured as the demonstration was broken up by the Libyan security forces. When general protests against the government spread to other towns the following day, the security forces employed lethal force. The protests escalated into a rebellion that spread across the country, with rebels establishing a provisional government named the National Transitional Council (NTC) based in the eastern city of Benghazi and the western city of Misrata (Cockburn, 2011; Barker, 2011).

Within days into the insurrection, the International Criminal Court (ICC) warned the then leader of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, President Maummar Qathafi that he and members of his government may have committed crimes against humanity which ushered in the passage of an initial resolution 1970 (UNSC/res/1970) by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 26, 2011 within ten days of the commencement of the crisis freezing the assets of Qathafi and members of his inner circle while also imposing travel ban on them (Keenan, 2011; Cockburn, 2011).

The particulars of the Res/1970 (2011) include:
i. Declarations to the effect of opening up Libya to humanitarian action;
ii. ICC referral;
iii. Arms embargo;
iv. Travel bans on designated persons;
v. Assets freeze.

2.3.2 Resolution 1973 (UNSC/res/1973)

On the 17th of March 2011, barely three weeks after the passage of Resolution 1970 the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 (UNSC/res/1973) on the state of Libya. This resolution determined "that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security". Thereafter it authorised Member States under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

> acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements…to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. (Clinton, 2011; Grant, 2011)

Thereto the resolution comprised:
i. The immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;
ii. Ban on flights and asset freeze of designated persons;
iii. Enforcement of a "no fly zone";
iv. Enforcement of the arms embargo; etc.

In sum, Resolution 1973 reaffirmed the objectives of Resolution 1970, giving even greater emphasis to the concept of "protection of civilians" and authorising governments to use all means, including force, to protect civilians in Libya.

3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Today, almost half a decade after NATO intervention, Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state as violent deaths and other human rights abuses have increased several fold in the country which now serves as centre for migrant trafficking and a safe haven for militias affiliated to diverse terrorist groups. Besides, the conflict which would have been resolved with few dead prolonged for several months resulting in more than 30,000 deaths, 50,000 injured and 4,000 missing (Guzman, 2014; Chengu, 2015).

On yet another count, the invasion and consequent fall of the Qathafi administration did not only create the worst insecurity case scenarios, it also holds serious potential for increased regional instability for the Sahel region and beyond. For instance, Qathafi's Tuareg soldiers of Malian descent fled home with heavy weapons of war with which they launched a rebellion in their country, prompting the overthrow of the Malian Government (Middle East Revised, 2015).

Evidently and perhaps more than the Libyan people, Sub-Sahara Africa stands out as the biggest immediate loser from the intervention in Libya as Qathafi's generous aid, grants and loans, provided beneficiary African states a degree of independence from the harsh conditions of the Western run International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB); while Qathafi's large scale development programs, especially on oil and water infrastructure among other projects, provided jobs for hundreds of thousands of Sub-Saharan African migrant workers and specialists who remitted much returns to their home countries, helping in balance of payments and reducing deficits and poverty at home (Abugre, 2011).

Qathafi's exit also means Sub-Sahara Africa will suffer a huge set-back with the cancellation of the proposed Central Bank of Africa and proposed gold backed currency that would have rewritten international economic history in favour of Africa and the Third World as a whole (Abugre, 2011).

In all the invasion of Libya enters as a crime against a sovereign state, and worse of all an attempt to arbitrarily decree a new international law while deriding and dismissing the African Union's peace initiative which was of the view that the aftermath of a forceful regime change would be worse for the Libyan people and which eventually became the case (Chossudovsky, 2013; Forte, 2012).

4. METHODOLOGY

This study adopts an interpretive orientation within which a qualitative design is employed to source and interpret data. However owing to the absence of independent observers and the continued chaotic situation in Libya secondary data superseded primary data. To this end, the former was sourced from books, reports and journals. Search engines used include ABI/Inform, ELIN, Emerald, Libris, Google Scholar, Spiegel Online and the Katalogportal. Key words for the search comprised; NATO, responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention and Libya.

5. THEORETICAL THRUST

Realism is not one particular theory but a collection of theories with the common belief that it is impossible to achieve fundamental qualitative progress in international politics (IP) otherwwise, that it is not possible to achieve a lasting peace, where peace is understood as stability and order, Thus, the realist paradigm describes a family of theories built around a handful of core beliefs among them that states are chiefly driven by selfish motives and may act forcefully because there is no higher authority that sits above them. This absence of hierarchy in the international system is commonly called anarchy, which does not mean chaos and violence, but that states are sovereign political entities with no formidable check by a stronger organisation and the acquisition of power is essential for survival in the anarchic nature of the international system (Soendergaard, 2008).

For Waltz, realists argue for this in three different ways. The first image is premised on human nature: "Wars result from selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses and from stupidity". Second image is to look for explanations on national or domestic policy level: "defects in states cause wars among them"; while the third image is to find the cause in the international system's anarchic structure: "In anarchy there is no automatic harmony" (Waltz, 1993, pp.124-129).

Realists are guided by a number of assumptions among them that:

i. Calculations about power dominates state thoughts on a broad note, thus states compete for power among themselves;

ii. There is a zero-sum quality to that competition, which sometimes makes it disastrous.

iii. That states cooperate with each other for sure, but at the root they have conflicting interests, not a harmony of interests. As such there are no permanent allies or permanent enemies;

iv. War is a legitimate instrument of statecraft given that power is the most important component of the international system.

Among varying types of realism, realist scholars often disagree, for example, as to whether states are offensively or defensively inclined and whether human nature or the structure of the international state system is a more important driver of state behaviour.

Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau believe that states are hardwired with an insatiable lust for power and thus they invariably seek to maximize their share of relative power and that states want power simply because it is a part of human nature (Morgenthau, 1946).

Thus, Morgenthau defines success within the international system as "the degree to which one is able to maintain, increase, or demonstrate one's power over another" (Morgenthau, 1967).

On the other hand, structural realism, otherwise neorealism, does not consider the role of human nature as causal to conflict rather it focuses on the structure of the international state system. To this end, states do not engage in conflict because of human nature, but because their environment creates incentives for them to do so.

Hence, for structural realists states want power because the architecture of the international system has no centralised authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above them and this anarchic nature is the reason why realism remains the domineering theory of international relations. For example, not many states consider the UN to be a coercive force within the international system (Waltz, 1979, 2000; Soendergaard, 2008).

Thus, while classical realism focuses on the power-seeking character of human nature, structural realism focuses on the anarchic character of the international system. Despite their different motivations, both strands shed light on states' national interests and their desire to increase power.

On yet another note, "defensive realism" explains that states are more inclined to sit back and accumulate only as much power as is needed to ensure security, and also work to preserve an existing, stable balance of power. Hence, states act much more conservatively so as not to create enemies and exacerbate security dilemmas; while 'offensive realism' explains that states are inclined to go on the offensive, wage unprovoked wars, and accumulate as much power as possible in order to ensure just as much their security as their hegemony in the international system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2007).

6. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING TO NATO'S INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

The roots of the 2011 Libyan crisis lie in the political upheavals associated with the "Arab Spring" protests that spread from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond in the early months of 2011. For Libya the assumed civil protests which had begun peacefully on February 15, 2011 with the apparent intent of demanding improved civil and political rights became increasingly violent spreading to virtually all dominant cities of Libya and rapidly raising within a few days an armed opposition government, which dubbed itself the "Transitional National Council" (TNC), establishing a firm hold over the cities of Benghazi and Tobruk. By late February and early March, however, loyalist units had re-established control over much of Libya and by mid-March were threatening to crush the rebellion at its base in Benghazi (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

In the ensuing fiasco the UN and Amnesty International affirmed that violence was actually initiated by the "protesters" to which the government responded militarily but never intentionally targeted civilians or resorted to "indiscriminate" force, as Western media reported while exaggerating the death toll by a factor of ten, citing "more than 2,000 deaths" in Benghazi whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented only 233 deaths across all of Libya at the time (Kuperman, 2013).

In Misurata, the Libyan city that was most consumed by early fighting, HRW reports that of the 949 people wounded in the rebellion's initial seven weeks, 30 were women or children. During that same period, only 257 people were confirmed dead of the city's population of 400,000; a fraction of less than 0.0006; providing additional proof that the Libyan government avoided using force indiscriminately (Kuperman, 2013).

Yet within a few days of the inception of the crisis, the ICC sent signals to Qathafi that he and members of his government had committed crimes against humanity. The warnings were accompanied by the United Nations passage of two Security Council resolutions. The first, UNSCR 1970 (February 26), imposed an arms embargo and froze regime assets. The second, UNSCR 1973 (March 17), authorised a "no-fly zone" over Libya as well as the use of "all necessary means" to protect Libyan civilians.

By Resolution 1973 the UN decided that all non-military means of stopping Qathafi had been exhausted and thus called on UN member states to fulfil their "responsibility to protect" otherwise authorising the use of military force on Libya, consequent upon which the US led NATO began aerial assaults on Libya (Nazemroaya, 2011).

Nazemroaya however notes that in the wild rush to destroy Libya, attempts at diplomacy were stifled and peace talks were subverted. Libya was barred from representing itself at the UN where shadowy non-governmental organisations and "human rights" groups took hold of the media propagating exaggerations and outright falsehoods that served to sanction aerial bombardments of Libya in the name of "humanitarian intervention" while Syria guilty of the crimes for which Qathafi's government was accused was not selected for intervention (Nazemroaya, 2011).

Nazemroaya further affirms that from the outset, the Pentagon and NATO did not only arm the NTC in violation of international law, they also had forces on the ground from the start while Italy had opened its military bases for use by the US, Britain and France prior to UN approval while repudiating its non-aggression pact with Libya as early as February 27, 2011 (Nazemroaya, 2011; Hosenball, 2011).

NATO's action according to Kuperman magnified the conflict's duration sixfold and its death toll at least sevenfold, given that NATO overstepped its official mandate of protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas under attack or threat of attack and rather pursued a preset goal aimed at regime change of the leadership of a "rogue state" while also exacerbating human rights abuses, human suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and the Sahel. The campaign ended on the 31st of October, 2011, with the death of Qathafi (Morton & Hernandez-Ramos, 2015; Kuperman, 2013).

7. ACCOUNTS OF NATO'S PURSUIT OF REGIME CHANGE

NATO's aggressive pursuit of regime change supports the claim that R2P principles were grossly violated as UNSC Resolution 1973 did not authorise offensive action or regime change. This became apparent as NATO violated the arms embargo by actively supplying weapons to the rebels, even as many had links to extremism and further violated the framework of the UN resolution through the use of British, American and Canadian soldiers on the ground (Wang, Kusnetz, & Beckett, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2011).

The basis of UNSC mandate for a limited intervention stemmed from the fact that Libya did not pose a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, given the uncorroborated claim of "massacre" the legal rationale was highly tenuous. It is unlikely given Libya's "pariah" status within the international community that it could have been a genuine threat to international peace and security (Wang, Kusnetz, & Beckett, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2011; Flores, 2015).

On yet another count, NATO used more than 200 cruise missiles and 20,000 bombs in its operation in Libya, besides assaults on non-military targets, to support the opposition (Pugliese, 2012); while significant damage to civilian infrastructure were confirmed for which a rationale was not evident nor risks to civilians made clear (Chivers, 2011).

Furthermore, as the operation wore on, NATO struck the homes of Qathafi loyalists, killing women and children. In one instance, NATO bombed the house of Brigadier General Musbah Diyab, killing not only him but also seven women and children. Evidently, NATO pursued an aggressive, offensive strategy, overstepping its UN mandate (BBC Radio. 1 September 2011).

Nazemroaya avows that Libya is targeted because it is one among several remaining countries outside America's sphere of influence which fail to conform to US demands adding further that the so-called "protesters" were armed, and when this became apparent they eventually began to portray themselves as "rebel forces" and who in essence were forces cultivated and organised before any opposition activities were even reported in Libya. Emadi thus insists that the protection of civilians was not the major motivation for NATO's intervention in Libya; rather it was a move to topple a regime that crossed the line drawn by imperial powers (Emadi, 2012, pp.134-138; Nazemroaya, 2011, 2014).

Charles Abugre regional director for Africa, United Nations Millennium Campaign alludes to this view drawing from Franco Bechis' account that, active planning for regime change in Libya by the French began in 2010 when Nuri Mesmar, Qathafi's Chief of Protocol and his closest associate, arrived in Paris for surgery. However Mesmar was not met by doctors but by the French Secret Service and French President Sarkozy's closest aides. Mesmar later worked alongside Colonel Gehan Abdallah, whose militia subsequently led the rebellion and Colonel Khalifa who has been living in the United States since the '80s apparently working as an agent for the CIA (Abugre, 2011).

Campbell on his part raises issues on how 6,000 Qatari troops, thousands of foreign mercenaries, and hundreds of NATO Special Forces had to be dressed up as "rebels" so that Tripoli could be captured (Campbell, 2013).

On yet another count, one may question why NATO failed to attack rebel fighters who were accused of engaging in acts of torture and execution of the regime's perceived supporters. CBC news (13 September 2011) affirms this noting that as the rebels gained momentum in the conflict, their actions grew increasingly violent with reports of arbitrary detentions, disappearances, torture and summary executions In one incident, the bodies of 53 Qathafi loyalists were found executed with their hands tied (HRW, 2011).

8. ASSESSMENT OF THE MOTIVATIONS FOR NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

The Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt did not motivate any large scale humanitarian alert following the resignation of their leaders unlike in Libya where "brother leader" Maummar Qathafi vehemently resisted the protests but what was tagged peaceful demonstrations rapidly transformed into violent insurrection against Qathafi and his loyalists, leading to unimagined response from the international community.

Much review and analysis subsisted during and after the NATO intervention as to why the Qathafi regime was quickly ousted by the intervening nations. Most of the reasons proffered support the thesis that foreign policy interests of the intervening nations, otherwise realpolitik calculations, and geo-strategic considerations constitute the prime motivations of the invaders.

8.1 Geo-Strategic and Economic Motivations

For Chengu, part of the hegemonic incentives for the intervention hovers around the demands of particularly the US corporatocrats especially as it concerns the erection of new military bases which means billions of dollars for America's military elite. Hence, as in the past following the bombing of Iraq, the United States built new bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia (Chengu, 2015).

Again, following the bombing of Afghanistan, the United States is building military bases in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and following the recent bombing of Libya, the United States has built new military bases in the Seychelles, Kenya, South Sudan, Niger and Burkina Faso (Chengu, 2015).

Joyce extensively elaborates that besides the strategic importance of Libya's low-sulphur crude, Libya holds some 46.4 billion barrels of oil reserves; the largest in Africa and given the country's close proximity to Europe it stands out as an extremely valuable oil and natural gas provider to European energy markets (Joyce, 2011).

Forte on his part explains that the invasion of Libya was not about human rights, nor entirely about oil, but about a larger process of militarising US relations with Africa and that the development of the Pentagon's Africa Command, (AFRICOM), was in fierce competition with Pan-Africanist initiatives such as those spearheaded by Qathafi who is strongly opposed to AFRICOM (Forte, 2012).

Perkins (2011) on his part notes that the intervention was more about currency and loans above all other reasons stating that:

 According to the IMF, Libya's Central Bank is 100% state owned and holds nearly 144 tons of gold in its vaults. It is significant that in the months running up to the UN resolution that allowed the US and its allies to send troops into Libya, Qathafi was openly advocating the creation of a new currency that would rival the dollar and the euro. In fact, he called upon African and Muslim nations to join an alliance that would make this new currency, the gold dinar, their primary form of money and foreign exchange. They would sell oil and other resources to the US and the rest of the world only for gold dinars.

The US, the other G-8 countries, the World Bank, IMF, BIS, and multinational corporations do not look kindly on leaders who threaten their dominance over world currency markets or who appear to be moving away from the international banking system that favours the corporatocracy. Saddam Hussein had advocated policies similar to those expressed by Qathafi shortly before the US sent troops into Iraq.

In sum, Qathafi's creation of the African Investment Bank in Sirte (Libya) and the African Monetary Fund in Cameroun to supplant the IMF undermines Western economic hegemony in Africa. Such moves would also mean economic harm to France because when the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank in Nigeria starts printing gold-backed currency, it would ring the death knell for the CFA franc through which Paris has maintained its neocolonial grip on 14 former African colonies for the last 50 years. Thus, attacking Quathafi can be understood in the context of America and Europe fighting for their survival, which an independent Africa jeopardises (Muhammad, 2011).

8.2 Neoliberal Motivations

For a liberal interpretation of the conflict in Libya that moves away from a rigid moral interpretation, one has to turn to the democratic peace theory. This theory posits that "differences in religion, language, and other characteristics contribute to war" (Levy, 1989, p.83). NATO intervened in Libya because of the absence of institutional similarities or like-minded social, political and economic beliefs (Fernandes, 2013; Levy, 1989, p.83).

NATO as a collective security arrangement guarantees peace among its members but requires assertive actions against outsiders. From this vantage point, the Libyan intervention was not just about curbing human rights violations; it was also about the promotion of neoliberal values through regime change. Such a neoliberal thrust undermines the notion that protecting civilians was the prime motivator for NATO's intervention and explains why NATO looked the other way when the opposing rebels committed human rights violations and ultimately needed rebel boots on the ground to institute political change (Fernandes, 2013).

8.3 Evidence From Previous Interventions

According to Chossudovsky (2011, 2013), the strategic assumptions behind "Operation Libya" are reminiscent of previous US-NATO military undertakings in Yugoslavia and Iraq among others.

In Yugoslavia, US-NATO forces triggered a civil war. The objective was to create political and ethnic divisions, which eventually led to the breakup of the country. This objective was achieved through the covert funding and training of armed paramilitary armies, first in Bosnia (Bosnian Muslim Army, 1991-1995) and subsequently in Kosovo (Kosovo Liberation Army, 1998-1999). In both Kosovo and Bosnia, media disinformation (including outright lies and fabrications) were used to support US-EU claims that the Belgrade government had committed atrocities, thereby justifying a military intervention on humanitarian grounds (Chossudovsky, 2013).

NATO intervened in Kosovo because European states wanted to protect their own security, whereas the US sought to maintain its hegemony in Europe. Likewise, NATO intervened in Libya because it was afraid of Qathafi's potential to sponsor terrorists again and to use chemical weapons against Western states. To remove such threats, regime change became the main objective of their intervention which however was a clear abuse of the UNSC mandate. This argument is well-supported by the fact that NATO left Libya soon after the killing of Qathafi despite the continuation of sporadic violence in various parts of the country. This blatant mandate abuse implies that realism still dominated the motivations for intervention regardless of adoption of R2P (Reiff, 2011; Kumar, 2012; Kuwali, 2012).

On yet a similar count, the fact that the intervention in Libyan stemmed more from realist motives other than humanitarian motives has been further established from the rapidity of the passage of resolution for the intervention in comparison to those of other crisis ridden countries, for example, the transatlantic community launched an illegal humanitarian intervention into Kosovo in 1999, but did not repeat such actions in Syria where biological weapons were used on civilian population. Meanwhile, in Yemen, the international community refrained from enforcing any resolutions. It took the

Council almost a year after the start of the Yemen uprising to pass a resolution (Resolution 2014 of October 21, 2011) which did not sanction any R2P action, but advocated a Yemeni-led political appeasement process.

Contra distinctly, in Libya where there were unsubstantiated claims of genocide the passage of a Resolution was extremely fast and the duration of the intervention unduly prolonged. It shows that the Libyan crisis received the fastest military response of all "Arab Spring" crises and those of the '90s (Carpenter, 2013).

The non-application of R2P in Syria, Yemen and Bharain explains the selective character of the R2P which poses a potential fatal risk to the future application of the norm. Explicating this development, Hillstrom admits that who intervenes where is a question of alliances and advanced that the selectivity resulted from the fact that Bahrain is an ally of the West and any action against the regime there would result in the strengthening of the Shiite majority and shift power in the region toward Iran besides the fact that both Bahrain and Yemen rank among REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING the staunchest allies of the US in the Middle East region; For example, Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet (Forte, 2012; Hillstrom, 2011).

9. ANALYSIS

Several scholars deny the justification of the NATO intervention and argue that R2P was not used in Syria, Bahrain or Yemen where more egregious crimes against humanity were being committed and where government clampdown on demonstrators were no less forceful than in Libya. From the findings of Ford the R2P principle is the Obama regime's favored formula for pouring mud in the otherwise clear waters of international law (Ford, 2011).

Of primary significance is the fact that Qathafi's Libya had a notoriously confrontational relationship with the West and for several years sustained a "rogue state" status as the regime variously refused to be a US client state in the Middle East, aside nationalising US and British oil interests ultimately sustaining the country's "pariah state" status within the committee of nations (Muhammad, 2011; Zoubir, 2009, 2011; Flores, 2015).

Opponents of regime change argue that military force was not used as the last resort and that UNSCR 1973, which ordered the use of force was passed just three weeks after UNSCR 1970 was adopted, without giving it some chance to work and that military force should have been justified only if all other non-violent measures have been tried and failed. Thus, the abuse and misuse of Resolution 1973 by Western interventionists in Libya led to a strengthening of the suspicions by most nations of the Global South that R2P is a new cover for Western neo-imperial domination and liberal warmongering as

NATO acted as the air force wing of the anti-Qathafi rebels, committing the very crimes against humanity that the doctrine purports to stop all impairing the future prospects of the R2P doctrine. Hence, China and Russia with obvious strategic and commercial interests in Syria cashed on NATO's abuse of mandate to defeat two Security Council Resolutions on Syria given that Russia highly values Syria as a long-term defenses equipment buyer and host to former's naval presence in the Syrian Mediterranean sea port of Tartus (Nuruzzaman, 2012, p.63, 2013; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011; Bello, 2011; Prashad, 2012; Forte, 2012; Roth, 2004; Bush, Martiniello, & Mercer, 2011).

10. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERVENTION FOR AFRICA

The Africa Union (AU) lost a lot of credibility in some quarters because it was completely sidelined during the Libyan crisis. Pondi maintains that it is unfair to say the AU had no plan to resolve the stalemate between Qathafi and the rebels because it was completely sidelined during the Libyan crisis. According to him the road map was clear, firstly to put a ceasefire in place, secondly to organise a meeting between the protagonists and then to organise elections in Libya. The plan was there, but it was not even given considerations at any of the meetings concerning Libya at the time (Pondi, 2013).

Be that as it may, Abugre on his part avows that:

i. The invasion will undoubtedly turn Libyans from a proud people who know little abject poverty (in spite of Qathafi's dictatorship and several years of economic sanctions) into a typical sub-Saharan African type of a few wealthy people swimming in increasing pools of desperately poor people with severely wounded pride.

ii. Second, it is not inconceivable that various armed factions will emerge from centuries old tribal and clan divisions which would inevitably be widened and like Iraq, Libya's change will not be for the good for a long time to come.

iii. Third, between 500,000 to 1 million workers from across Africa south of the Sahara have been displaced, and adding to the already over-flowing pool of the unemployed. The president of Niger estimated the displaced Nigerien workforce to be in the region of 200,000. Is anybody intending to compensate for these losses?

iv. Fourth, the effect of this displacement is not simply that it aggravates the already scary poverty situation it also exacerbates the insecurity in these fragile zones, especially the area stretching from Mauritania, across Niger, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti. These areas are fragile and volatile

in several respects; ecologically, economically, socially and in terms of potential for armed conflicts. The potential for violent conflict will be made worse by increased availability of arms of all sorts.

v. Fifth, the intervention deprived Africa of investment resources and undermined the creation of institutions that are critical for the poorest continent to transform its countries' economies and overcome suffering and the indignity of poverty. It has transformed the African Union from one representing all of Africa to one effectively representing Africa south of the Sahara in the manner that Libya has been characterized by the invaders (as an Arab country), a characterization that the rebels seem to carry proudly on their chests.

vi. Sixth, the military bombardments of Libya resulted in the shifting of capital from Libya to the invaders. Directly, they have seized the assets of the Libyan people[2] owned by Libyan public institutions and re-channeled them into expenditures (Abugre, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Drawing from analysed data, the study concludes that NATO intervention in the Libyan crisis is typically a selective witch-hunt of the then Qathafi-led government of Libya as the motivation for the intervention aimed at regime change of a non-compliant government.

The Security Council's inability to initiate actions on Syria among other countries espouses evidence of selective intervention understandable in the context of America and Europe fighting for their survival, which an independent Africa jeopardises. To remove such threats, regime change became the main objective of their intervention (Reif, 2012). This argument is further supported by the fact that NATO left Libya soon after the murder of Qathafi despite the continuation of sporadic violence in various parts of the country (Kumar, 2012); all displaying a clear abuse of the UNSC mandate which aimed at protecting civilians and not regime change or support to the rebels (Kuwali, 2012). As such Realpolitik "self-help" factors (Waltz, 1979, p.111) other than humanitarian motivations are of primary significance for the intervention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends that should the need for humanitarian intervention arise in the future it should be the prerogative of the Human Rights Council (HRC) to determine whether the threshold for humanitarian intervention has been reached and to recommend to the General Assembly whether collective humanitarian intervention should be undertaken. The General Assembly would then vote to authorise any necessary action.

Bello (2011) specifically suggests that military units belonging to hegemonic powers; in particular, the US and NATO; must not be allowed to participate in an intervention. Again, the humanitarian force must aim only at stopping the genocide, and must withdraw once the situation has stabilised, and must refrain from sponsoring and propping up alternative government as was typically the case in the Libyan crisis.

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[2] The US impounded US$30 billion of Libyan foreign reserves. Britain impounded undisclosed bank accounts and assets, including UK£700 million worth of Libyan dinars printed by a British currency printing firm, De la Rue, which they are likely to give to the rebels (Abugre, 2011).

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