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A Response to S. N. Balagangadhara's "Translation, Interpretation and Culture"

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S. N. Balagangadhara wrote an essay entitled, "Translation, Interpretation and Culture: On the Disingenuity of a Comparative Theology," which appeared in this journal in 2014.[1] In it, Balagangadhara defends his theory of translation and supports that theory by deconstructing the field of comparative theology, which he finds unreflective and unsophisticated, at best. The tool of that deconstruction is a sharply critical assessment of several sections of my 2010 *Comparative Theology*.[2] That book, meant to introduce readers to the field even while not being itself a work of comparative theological practice, draws on my other, earlier books, none of which Balagangadhara seems to have read.[3] Given Balagangadhara's sharply negative judgment on my work —assessing it to be fruitless, disingenuous, dissimulating, dishonest—I feel it necessary to respond to his essay, and I am grateful to *Canadian Social Science* for the opportunity to write this brief reply. I will first note some of his criticisms and respond to them. I then comment on what appears to be most crucial to Balagangadhara, his own theoretical reflections on translation at the start of the essay; I will note too how his comments on my work turn out to serve as a foil to his own theorizing, perhaps as a warning to those who do not work out their translation theory first. Finally, I comment briefly on the third, constructive part of his essay, with its unexpected reference to the 1960s reforming Council of the Catholic Church, Vatican II, and the intriguing notion that Balagangadhara might make a constructive contribution to post-Vatican II attitudes toward the diversity of religions.

It is important first of all to note how very critical the essay is. From the essay's subtitle onward, Balagangadhara's basic assertion is that I am disingenuous. This is a vice which he defines at the essay's start by an appeal to the Oxford online dictionary: "not candid or sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about something than one really does." (p.39) Later, he clarifies "disingenuous" by noting that I am also "dishonest." That he finds my work, and me, disingenuous and ultimately dishonest rests on his claim that comparative theology pretends to move to the borders between traditions, but in fact remains very much in the Christian mainstream, risking nothing at all. His sharp-edged assessment seems to depend on a distinction between theologians who stay at the center of their communities, and those who either move to the edge or, more usually, pretend to. It is not that Balagangadhara favors the former group, but that he seems ready to presuppose that a Christian theologian might be conceivably by comparative work move closer to the borders of other religious and theological traditions, but is more likely to hesitate and pull back. He claims that I do not in fact do much that can be counted as a departure from older Christian consumptions of the religious other:

> It is important to notice how [Clooney] has walked the tightrope and what its results are. The sub-title of his book, *deep learning across religious borders*, suggests that inter-religious learning should not only be "deep" but also that it is possible only at those borders *where religions meet each other*. We know for a fact that most Christian theologians have stayed at the centre while relating to other religions. Clooney promises to stay within the confines of Christianity, even as he touches its borders. (p.40)

Staying within one's own tradition, even while touching the borderline of another tradition, and perhaps

[1] *Canadian Social Science*, 2014, 10(5), 39-47.
[2] Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010.
[3] While I appreciate his close attention to certain aspects of the 2010 book, the severity of his criticisms warranted a somewhat deeper look into my work, not simply the report on my work that I give in *Comparative Theology*.

occasionally crossing it, seems to me a worthy intent, even if not the only path one might take. I did not include "only" in the subtitle, and did not make any claim in that regard. Balagangadhara, though, seems disappointed that I do not really approach the border at all, and therefore charges me with being disingenuous: I knew that I was not risking anything, and only pretended to, perhaps to impress readers such as himself. But borders are a complicated affair intellectually as in real life. Approaching them and even crossing them, with or without saying so, can be experienced and talked about in various ways. I am sorry that Balagangadhara does not contemplate the possibility of more than one expected outcome.

In the middle part of the essay, he notes several references I make to my work in the 2010 book. Thus, referring to Chapter 6, which reproduces a plenary address I had given at the Catholic Theological Society of America in 2003, he quotes these words of mine:

> To visit this temple and stand before the Goddess Laksmi opened for me new possibilities of vision beyond what I had seen or thought before…I knew that according to the Hindu tradition I was also being seen by Her…

I went on to say,

> There is no room for Laksmi in Christian theology, no easy theory that makes sense of Her presence…I suppose I might even have worshipped Her, because I was already there, as it was seeing and being seen. But Christians do not worship Goddesses, so I did not.

That I do not worship Her—apart from seeing and being seen—is an honest claim. Intentionally, I give no reason, other than observing that Christians do not worship Goddesses. Intentionally too, I make no critique of the Goddess, and nowhere in any of my writings have I criticized the deities of Srivaisnavism, Narayana and Sri Laksmi. In any case, the cited passages are near the beginning of the lecture, and it followed by a series of reflections that show how I found a way beyond the impasse, through a series of productive visits to various religious possibilities, and finally toward a productive Christian theology that neither demeans the Goddess nor asks Christians to worship Her.[4] Nothing in the rest of the essay—the real context for my remarks—is noted by Balagangadhara or makes it into his judgments. Rather, seemingly puzzled by my observation that Christians do not worship Goddesses, and apparently unclear why I mention this point, he devises his own interpretation:

> There is one way to make sense of Clooney here: He is claiming that there is "no room" in Christian theology for Laksmi as a *true Goddess*. However, there is "room" for her *as a false goddess*. So, Clooney is saying this: There is no room in Christian theology for true goddesses, but there is room for false goddesses. Because Christians do not worship the latter, Clooney does not worship Laksmi. If this is the case, why does he not say it openly and dissimulate instead? (p.42)

It is true that Christians do not worship Hindu goddesses; there is no room, no place in the church or in creed for such worship. One reason, the obvious one, might be that they are all false; another is that Christian monotheism, or Trinitarianism if you will, can leave no room for a Goddess. As I have already mentioned, I myself avoid pronouncements on truth and falsehood, and say simply, "I could have worshipped her, but do not." The point is reinforced at the end of the same lecture (and the subsequent book chapter) where I express an admittedly Christocentric entrance upon real religious openness:

> To be a Christian is simple and startlingly clear. We focus on Christ, we see everything. But, if so, we lose control. Every now and then, we find ourselves standing anew before God, in faces, voices, and words we did not know before. It may be a Laksmi in her temple, reminding us how the holy feels close up. Or the most beautiful Devi teaching us to see the divine clearly, materially, blissfully. Or Mary giving us hope by her brave witness, standing there at God's death, or teaching us what it means not to be God, having no voice but God's word. Or Sojourner Truth telling the stark truth about loving our neighbors, every one of them. Or Paul seeing Christ, right through all the separations we make. Or all the other things we see because we have seen these things first. (*Comparative Theology*, p.106)

In the CTSA plenary address and in the related book, I am appealing to my readers to learn from Goddess traditions, primarily through the study, but also through temple visits when possible. Learn; go there; see for yourself. But this appeal is of no importance to Balagangadhara, since he is eager to reduce my position to comfortable claims about truth and falsity, so that he can then expose my alleged concealment of my opinion that goddesses are only false goddesses. He finds it easier and more satisfying to propose his own theory—"Clooney is really saying that Goddesses are false and not to be worshiped"—and to show how that claim is woefully inadequate. But I was careful with what I said and did not say, and dwelled in the comparative moment. Reading the rest of the lecture, in the context of the 2010 book, makes clear where I started and where I ended.

My presupposition is that not-saying is not hiding-what-one-really thinks. To not-say can be powerful, and the 2003 lecture was not the first time I found it necessary to say less, and no more, precisely because of standing at the border between traditions. In my 2001 book, *Hindu God, Christian God* (Cloonet, 2001). I made a similar claim about Lord Siva, with a conviction that theological understanding and judgment, in the interreligious context, are never simple. After noting that my project was aimed at drawing Hindu and Christian theologians into the study of each other's traditions, I added:

> I may also disappoint those more determined readers who find that I did not in the end actually decide which God, religion,

[4] I should note that I gave the lecture while writing my major book on the theme, Divine Mother, Blessed Mother: Hindu Goddesses and the Virgin Mary (2005); yes, I visited Her temple regularly, but my main work, then and now, is textual.

> or theology is the right one. I did not even say that Rahner's theology of divine embodiment is superior to Arul Nandi's or Vedanta Desika's. I did not conclude that Jesus is God and Śiva is not God. With annoyance they may point out that all I said was that theological decisions of that sort can in principle be made—and made persuasively—if someone is willing to do the work involved. I may therefore also disturb skeptics who believe that theological positions cannot be argued nor taken seriously as rational claims that might survive as true and applicable across linguistic, cultural, and religious boundaries. (Ibid., p.179)

I wrote this way not because I am disingenuous but because I care about the adequacy of language, and I respect the point at which one can no longer say certain things. In a way that predicts my 2003 lecture cited above, I deliberately put off, postpone, side-step the comfortable clarity about true and false that Balagangadhara is hoping for:

> In the long run, then, the questions about God's existence, presence and activity in the world, embodiment, and sacred word are questions that will entail great theological labor before they can be plausibly answered. In the short run, faith and reason must both do their work. On the one hand, I can assert the truths of the Christian faith without compromise; on the other, until the theological work is done, I can still state that these truths need to be tested in a comparative and dialogical conversation… I confess that Jesus is Lord, but I cannot now assert that Siva is not Lord nor that Narayana did not graciously undergo embodiment in order to enable humans to encounter their God. The work of the theologian is a work of faith and reason, and it is not complete until both have done the best they can. (Ibid., pp.180-181)

Not asserting something seems to me to be an honorable position particularly when, in such cases, I was not (disingenuously) speaking as if open-minded and as if careful about what I say and do not say, while (secretly, Balagangadhara supposes) knowing, and perhaps whispering to my co-religionists, that Siva is not divine, that Visnu did not undergo embodiment, and so forth. But in reading, it is better not to add words to what an author says, with the aim of being critical of the author for what he did (not) say. With respect to my experience in the Laksmi temple, then, I was simply not dealing with the issue of truth and falsehood. Balagangadhara is disappointed that he could not attack me on his chosen ground; so he moved me there for the sake of his argument.

As a second example, Balagangadhara quotes my appeal that Christian readers can take seriously, take to heart, the mantras of the Srivaisnava Hindu tradition: "An interreligious reading should at least mean that a Christian reader takes the mantras to heart and finds in them a way to hear and utter anew prayers central to the bible and Christian tradition. When we pray 'Abba, Father,' we can learn to hear an echo of the Tiru Mantra." (Ibid., p.80).

His comment again reflects his desire to reduce the alternatives only to undesirable choices, as he adds a clarity I did not myself offer, as if he knows my mind better than I know it myself: "Of course, [Clooney] *cannot possibly be saying* the Narayana of the Vaishnavas is the God that Clooney worships." (My emphases.) Balagangadhara seems to know more about me than I do, since my position was rather close to the position that Srivaisnavas and Catholics are in piety and theology not far apart when it comes to worship of God. My point, spelled out at length in the 2008 book, *The Truth, the Way, the Life* (Sebastian, 2008) and only summarized in the sections of the 2010 book Balagangadhara is looking at, is that before any judgment, we do well to attend to what Srivaisnava Hindus mean when, for instance, they call upon God as "Narayana." For that purpose, I study (and list) the 108 meanings that Vedanta Desika, the great 14th century theologian, gives to that most holy name; and I point out that nearly all those 108 means are compatible with the Christian understanding of God. To a large extent, our understandings of God and therefore our prayers, as meaningful assertions about the deity, do share much in common, with greatly overlapping recognitions of the perfection of God. I do not say that Narayana is not the God Christians worship, but rather that a stark dichotomy —this God or that God—is a theologically unnecessary judgment. The point, spelled out more fully in the 2008 book, is that we Catholics can take to heart and learn from the 108 meanings of "Narayana," learning in a way that can figure in our prayer.

Accentuating the controversial, Balagangadhara goes on to say, "In that case, a formidable question opens up: given that the Christians pray only to God and worship only Him, how can a mantra directed at *some other entity ever help* such a prayer?" (p.42) This is a fair question, that might have been posed constructively. But Balagangadhara's interpretation, liberated from context and eliding the argument of the 2008 book (briefly referred to in the 2010 book), again reduces my intentions by over-clarification to a position he can then attack. In his opinion, what I really mean, though I do not say it, is that the Srivaisnava Hindus have "not yet found this 'true God'" of Christianity. The real reason, he decides, is because I cannot hear the mantras properly, but merely misinterpret them in the standard Christian way. Ignoring the intent and goal of my exegesis of the holy name "Narayana" and my reading it in accord with the traditional Srivaisnava commentaries, for some reason he adds that I am recommending that Christians "not focus on the actual object of worship." He thinks that what I mean to say, but did not say, is that Hindu prayers only echo true worship (p.43):

> When he prays 'Abba, Father', all that a Christian can *learn to hear* are the *echoes* of those others who have not yet found this 'true God'. He cannot hear the *sound* of the mantra; all he "can learn" to hear is its mere echo. Clooney's inter-religious reading *only apparently* does not focus on false gods; this lack of focus is only 'apparent' because the mantras cannot substitute for the Christian *prayer*, which is directed only at the true God. Clooney implicitly says is that even when men *worship* entities *other than God*, Christians should take cognizance of their

> desire to worship the true God and not focus on the actual object of worship. If we do this, we can indeed hear the echoes of other 'religiosities'; after all, *false* religion is also *religion*. (p.43)

All this may tell us something about Balagangadhara's view of Christian piety, but it has little to do with my position or what I wrote. In my view, the comparative process enables one to hear together the several prayers and mantras, and in hearing them together, in some way to enter upon the realities of which those prayers speak. My study of the mantras—and the names of God, the exegesis by Vedanta Desika, etc. —has nothing to do with the notion that Narayana is a "false god," or with the notions of "true" and "false" religions—an idea that is outdated even in mainstream Catholic theology today. My work, as an honest (and not dishonest) attempt at learning, is aimed at inviting Christians to esteem what we can learn from the Srivaisnava worship of Narayana, and not to turn away from the evocative power of the mantras. Balagangadhara prefers to see my work as disingenuous and dishonest.

Shifting then to an earlier part of the 2010 book where I reviewed the history of how Christians have approached other religions, Balagangadhara takes exception to my observation that "even the more enclosed medieval European Christian era was not lacking in instances of interreligious learning. We can think here of Aquinas's dialogue with Jewish and Muslim thinkers in the *Summa Theologiae."* He is not impressed, since he thinks that such learning was not possible. He asserts, somewhat off the point, that

> if Aquinas "learnt" from the Jewish and Muslim thinkers about his own religion through this dialogue, he must have learnt the most from Aristotle, a pagan thinker if ever there was one. If this is an instance of inter-religious learning, then the history of Christianity is the story of an unbroken process of inter-religious and intra-religious (surely, there were also "dialogues" with the heretics') learning! (p.43)

In Balagangadhara's view here again my thinking is disingenuous, because he thinks that noting Aquinas' learning would somehow be a blessing for each and every instance of supposed learning. That may be so, or at least interesting to debate, but Balagangadhara prefers a black and white judgment that serves to highlight the dishonesty of my comment. In my view, interreligious learning does happen all the time: no tradition is sealed off from others; even imperfect learning, flawed (and even sinfully so), can still be real learning. Learning from Aristotle does not cancel out learning from Ibn Sina or Maimonides. But Balagangadhara seems to want it to be the case that no Christian interreligious learning can be recognized or appreciated, if its motives and methods are not entirely clear in the way he would prefer.

Thereafter he makes the general claim that my comparative work is really all about showing that Hinduism is a false religion: "In short, when Clooney sets up a comparison between his 'Hinduism' and his Christianity, his own terms of description sets up a comparison between idolatry and the worship of the 'true' God, or between the true religion and the false religions." (p.43) He says this, though the language and indictments accruing to charges of idolatry are nowhere discussed in my book, and nothing I say, in the 2010 book or elsewhere, supports the view that I think what is at stake is a contrast between true and false religions. In his view, the old missionaries were at least honest: "Historically, that is how Christianity set up the debate. But the virtue of that old discussion is that these ideas have been proclaimed openly and honestly by their proponents. Clooney, however, does not do so; he *dissimulates* instead." (p.43) Pushing home his point, he argues that either I am not a Christian believer, or that my work, ignoring the Hindu insistence on "faith in experience" and not "experience of faith," is actually no learning at all:

> Clooney has not touched any religious border in any sense of the term. His "deep learning" is disingenuous: It *hides* the fact that there is no learning. His distance from the early theologians is a vanishing point and woefully inadequate to understand diversity, whether Ancient or modern.

Balagangadhara does not explain this harsh judgment, which requires that he reads my mind (apparently in lieu of reading my books) in order to pass judgment on my scholarship and theology, for the sake of the conclusion that my work is "woefully inadequate." He has thus moved with great haste from the obvious fact that much more is to be said on the topic of how Christians and Hindus are to relate, to what he thinks is a clear proof of the total failure of my comparative theology, which is for some reason a matter of "hand-wringing," obliviousness to the questions he finds central, and again, proof of the disingenuous:

> The nebulous and vague story of Clooney [in giving a sketch of "Hinduism"] does not even begin to capture the questions that the Indian culture and her 'religions' have faced and continue to face. In this sense, if there is to be a true inter-religious dialogue, one needs honest and open discussions and not merely some well-intentioned hand-wringing…

Rather, he adds, Clooney "has demonstrated his inability even to suspect the questions that underlie the task." This in turn enables Balagangadhara to make what he finds to be a clarion call: "It is high time that intellectuals 'open their eyes' and 'look newly' at *this reality*, instead of being disingenuous if they want to seek truth." (p.46) Insofar as this means that scholars like me can learn from scholars like him, I can only agree; I have respect for his scholarship. But insofar as his notions are now to serve as the measure for truth and honesty, there is no reason to agree with him.

Similarly, when I point out that the missionaries, even as apologists and intent upon conversions, did in fact learn a great deal about the religions of Asia, often as the pioneers of this learning, Balagangadhara will have no part of this measured acknowledgment of their study

and learning. Again accusing me of "hand-wringing"—oddly missing even the affect of my writing—he now judges that I am asking for applause, deliberate in my obfuscations, (again) disingenuous, and finally, at long last, "dishonest:"

> When [Clooney] wrings his hands because he finds polemics "creeping" into even the most "energetic efforts to learn," one feels like throwing up one's hands; *what precisely were the missionaries so 'energetically' trying to learn*? They were in India to convert people into Christianity and preach the Gospels. What were they supposed to learn except how to fulfill their vocation properly? Surely, all their 'learning' was an integral part of this endeavour. Clooney's deliberate obfuscations here are not merely disingenuous; they are dishonest as well. (p.45)

As with Aquinas, it is quite fair to argue that the missionaries were studying the texts they had access too, observing rituals, customs related to birth and death, marriage and the ownership of property, and they were studying the languages as best they could. They were really learning—not "merely learning"—energetically and in very difficult circumstances. But Balagangadhara has decided that because the missionaries were missionaries, real learning was not their goal; and such learning was impossible anyway. But his standards are too high, at least regarding others. Much learning occurs in imperfect situations, pursued by people biased in their dispositions. It happens even today.

Here I must back up a bit. Although the criticisms of comparative theology as exemplified in my work constitute the distinctive middle section of the essay, the part that readers will notice, what really matters for Balagangadhara himself is his own theory of translation, put forward in the first pages of the essay. Translation is difficult, complicated, and it is hard to know if one is getting it right. Insistence on an incommensurability of cultures would make this impossible, while the assumption of universal commonalities would make translation seem very easy, when it is not, and would render it vulnerable to one culture's—usually that of the modern West—notion of the universal. So one must clarify the grounds on which one thinks cross-cultural and interreligious communication are possible. All of this is interesting, translation is a wonderful and vexing topic, and Balagangadhara's insights are worthy of consideration.

But as the essay is written, that first part, with its interesting thoughts on the problem of translation, is made to serve as the measure for anything to be said in or about the comparative work. Balagangadhara's references to comparative theology and my work serve only to show how things go wrong when one does not follow theoretical strictures such as he proposes. This is why in the second part of the essay he shows little interest in my actual reading of Hindu theological texts, my actual work of translation, or any of my other books, but finds it sufficient to take the 2010 book as sufficient proof of the disingenuous, dissimulating, and dishonest nature of my work.

And so, after concluding the first part of his essay by a series of good questions about translation from Sanskrit to English, with attention also to who decides which is a good translation or not, he decides that comparative theology must be judged by whether or not it takes up his questions: "These are some of the questions that a twenty-first century comparative theology faces in its quest. Thus, Clooney must confront these questions and seek answers." Unless those questions are front and center, nothing new will occur:

> If Clooney does not take up this job, there is only one route open to him: he has to presuppose as true what requires the proof of its truth. That is, he has to presuppose the truth of the 'consensus' that has emerged from centuries of habitual Christian-theological thinking about self and the other. Inevitably, his 'comparative theological study' will then end up reproducing the very same descriptions that Christian theology has produced of the Indian culture and its traditions for centuries. (pp.41-42)

We all benefit from new challenges. But as the core of his essay, reviewed above, shows, Balagangadhara already knows that Clooney has not risen to the occasion and has sought to elude the honest work Balagangadhara has assigned him. As a result, Balagangadhara opines, nothing new emerges, no new learning can take place. Comparative theology is a failure, as will be any learning that does not first deal with the issues he thinks important.

His notion of translation turns out to be the only real counter to "centuries of habitual Christian-theological thinking about self and other." The actual work of translation – such as often fills my books—cannot matter, just as the serious reading of Hindu commentators cannot matter, since such work must always lead to the "same" views that have always been held by people like me. This is why Balagangadhara is eager to turn my examples—the Goddesses, the names of Narayana, the learning of Aquinas, etc. —into either/or dichotomies that prove the disingenuous and dishonest nature of my work.

Of course, this is not the only way to proceed. By contrast, were his goal to assess my work with respect to the old and recent ways Christians have talked about religions, it would have been necessary to do much more work on the Catholic theology of religions, so as to situate my theology and theological practice within the Christian theological tradition, comparing and contrasting it with that of other Catholic theologians—even with the work of other Jesuit scholars of Hinduism, over the past centuries. Without such further study, "Translation, Interpretation and Culture" lacks context. It turns out to be a theory searching for verification, and a search that finds my work a handy foil in showing the virtues of Balagangadhara's own work. Sadly, this could have been done in a constructive manner, not so dismissive and partial, and I would have been happy to hear and learn from Balagangadhara's views.

The last part of the essay seems to be intended to move beyond the criticism of Clooney toward a constructive proposal regarding what should happen if anything is to change. Here Balagangadhara takes the briefest look at the brief Vatican II document "Nostra Aetate" (1965), reading it in terms of his preferred language of "cultures." Without further ado he calls for new theological work: "We need to begin serious theological reflections on phenomena that exist in India and not undertake 'comparative theologies' when under the sway of dogmas quasi-universally held in the West for centuries." (p.47) At this point he seems to have put aside the problem of Clooney and Clooney's disingenuousness, dissimulation, and dishonesty, in order to call for fresh thinking, daring thinking, such as he himself exemplifies:

> However, now, as then, we need people who dare think and rethink what we see in this world and of what it is made up. If, as then, we seek truth and intend to move forward, we need to question radically our inherited experiences of the world and the staid dogmas that sustain them. This is the task facing us in *Nostra Aetate*, our time, which is the world of the twenty-first century and beyond. (p.47)

It is unexpected but pleasant to see that Balagangadhara apparently now includes himself in the "us" posed a new task after "Nostra Aetate," a document that, as a whole, merits a potentially interesting Hindu reading. But while he seems to laud "Nostra Aetate," despite its notion of the reflection of rays of the light of Christ, he hasn't here, at least, read the document as a whole, nor in light of the complicated history of Jewish-Christian relations that are its real starting point. Similarly, the conciliar document's own and different history, at the Council and in five decades of scholarly writing about it, make no appearance here. My own work is possible only in the post-Vatican II Church.[5] Nevertheless, Balagangadhara seems already to have decided that comparative work such as I do cannot possibly help in the "rethinking" that is required after Vatican II, his preferred "radical questioning" of our experiences and dogmas.

Driven by the purity of his views and constrained by the rigor of his judgments, Balagangadhara seems to think that every statement needs to fall into an either/or dichotomy; otherwise it is disingenuous and ultimately dishonest. Any language of complexity and shadings of gray, such as I suggest over and again, cannot be anything but a cover for the black and white views he loves to find and then to hate. Since I do not fit into his template, I must be disingenuous and dishonest in my work. To his disappointment, the history of religions and the history of theologies of religious others are always more complex and more mixed than he prefers. His desire for an argument on the simplest grounds and in validation of his own views, shows his fiery determination to be proven right. The effect unfortunately is to give off much heat and little light.

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[5] On the study of religions in the Catholic Church after Nostra Aetate, see for example, these essays which I have written on the topic: "The study of non-Christian religions in the post-Vatican II Roman Catholic Church," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies,* 1992, 28(3), 482-494; "Artful Imagining: A Personal Insight into the Study of Religions after Vatican," *Australian eJournal of Theology,* 2012, 19(2), 97-111; "In the Balance: Interior and Shared Acts of Reading," *Modern Theology,* 2013, 29(4); "Interreligious Reading in the Aftermath of Vatican II," 172-187; "How *Nostra Aetate* Opened the Way to the Study of Hinduism," in *Nostra Aetate: Celebrating 50 Years of the Catholic Church's dialogue with Jews and Muslims*. Edited by Pim Valkenberg and Anthony Cirelli. Catholic University of America Press, 2016.