

## An Assessment of the Management of Adhoc Electoral Staff and Electoral Violence in Rivers State of Nigeria 1999 – 2015

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Received 14 May 2021; accepted 17 June 2021

Published online 26 June 2021

### Abstract

This study employed the interview technique, focus group discussion and non-participant observation to attempt an assessment of the nexus between the pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff and election violence in Rivers State of Nigeria from 1999 – 2015 under the guidance of four hypotheses. The study was validated using the conventional means of discussion and consultation with the project supervisors and experts in election studies. The Test-retest method was used to establish the reliability of the instruments employed for the study within which percentile ratings and chi-square were employed for data analysis. The study found that the pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff contributed to the rise in the level of election violence within the state under review given that lack of transparency in recruitment, inadequate training, inadequate remuneration and absence of disciplinary measures for erring adhoc electoral staff were of primary significance in election fraud and attendant violence. The study also found that the process of recruitment of adhoc staff was rarely transparent. The study recommends that the government needs to evolve a reliable process of adhoc staff recruitment while providing for adequate training and remuneration in future elections.

**Key words:** Nigeria; Rivers State; Electoral fraud; Electoral violence; Adhoc staff recruitment; Adhoc staff training; Adhoc staff remuneration

Kuapie, N., & Wordu, A. S. (2021). An Assessment of the Management of Adhoc Electoral Staff and Electoral Violence in Rivers State of Nigeria 1999 – 2015. *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 17(2), 58-71. Available from: <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/ccc/article/view/12178> DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/12178>

### INTRODUCTION

According to Johari (2009), election is a most salient feature of democratic nations around the world. This invariably implies that the survival and sustenance of any democracy depends on the conduct of free and fair election.

Within this range Joab-Peterside concludes that election is an essential aspect of any political system because it is the means or mechanisms by which citizens are chosen or elected to occupy certain positions based on expressed preference both in favour of available political parties and candidates (p.37, 2018).

On his part Obakhedo identifies that elections are integral to democratic processes because they enable citizens to determine fairly and freely who should lead them at every level of government periodically and in case they falter, still possess the power to recall them or vote them out in the next election (2011).

However, the conduct of a free fair and transparent election in Nigeria is fraught with numerous challenges.

Joab-Peterside observes that the country has witnessed five general elections in the last sixteen years: 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Expectedly, is that there should be remarkable improvements in their conduct, but the reverse is the case as the situation degenerates from one election to the other especially in terms of violent social crises (2016).

In other words, violence at every election in the country has left in its wake devastating consequences ranging from destruction of properties and killings, injuries, displacement of families and communities. According to the International Federation for Election System (IFES) report of 2017, there were 967 incidents of electoral violence in the 2007 elections involving cases of abduction, kidnapping and murder. Human Right Watch (HRW, 2004) also had it that the 2011 post presidential election violence in some part of Northern Nigeria left 800 people dead and so many properties destroyed. This

trend of events in the electoral process undoubtedly portends grave danger for the sustenance and survival of the nation's democracy.

So many factors have accounted for election violence in Nigeria. These include outright desperation on the part of the political elite, corruption, ethnicity, poverty, lack of proper civic education, religion, lack of integrity, and mismanagement on the part of staff of election management body (EMB), for Nigeria the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) suffices for election management body.

One major factor responsible for the non-conduct of credible elections in Nigeria is the increasing use of "violence" to manipulate the electoral process.

Election violence predates the current democratic dispensation, but the magnitude of violence that characterized elections in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015 provokes much thought. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, between April and May 2003 about 100 people were said to have been killed and many more injured during the Federal and State elections in Nigeria (Egobueze and Callistus, 2017). Most of the problem associated with election violence are traced to the activities of adhoc staff recruited for election in Rivers State.

Most democratic nations of the world set up EMBs to oversee the conduct of Elections. In the case of Nigeria, different EMBs have emerged over the years. First was the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) set up to administer, manage and conduct the 1959 election that ushered in the first republic (Waleola, 2015).

The ECN was later renamed Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) by Sir Tafawa Belewa to conduct the 1964 General elections and the 1965 Western Regional elections. The incompetence and inability of FEC to conduct the elections in a free, fair and credible manner and the violence that ensued accounted largely for the collapse of the first Republic (Waleola, 2015).

In 1978 the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was set up under the then Military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo to conduct the transitional elections of 1979 which ushered in the second Republic with Alhaji Shehu Shagari emerging President. The violence and wanton destruction of life and property that followed the conduct of the 1983 general election led the military to overthrow the Government and consequently FEDECO was dissolved (Waleola, 2015). This was later followed by the setting up of the National Electoral Commission (NECO) in 1987 under the transitional military Government of General Ibrahim Babangida. The NECO under the chairmanship of Prof. Humphrey Nwosu conducted the local, state and national levels elections in 1987, 1990 and 1991 and the controversial 1993 presidential election which was annulled by the then Military president: Ibrahim Babangida. In 1994, the Military Government led by General Sani Abacha established the National Electoral

Commission of Nigeria (NECON). With the demise of Abacha and the enthronement of General Abdulsalami Abubakar as Military Head of State, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established in 1998 to conduct the 1999 General Election that ushered in the fourth Republic.

Essentially, the legal frameworks for conducting elections in Nigeria include the 1999 constitution (as amended), Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and guidelines issued by the INEC.

INEC was established by the provision of section 153(1f) of the 1999 constitution (amended), and its power as electoral umpire is detailed in the 2010 Electoral Act and the constitution. In the latter, sections 76(1) and 116(1) give INEC the power to fix dates for elections to the offices of the members of National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. Given that the period of office of the president and the governor is specified in sections 132(2) and 180(2) of the constitution as four years and not more than two terms in sections 137(1b) and 182(1b) respectively, elections to these

Offices are conducted every four years by INEC.

Since its inception, INEC has undergone various structural and administrative changes with five chairmen heading the commission beginning from its inception in 1998. It also conducted the 2003, 2007 and 2015 General elections.

That notwithstanding, the various structural and administrative changes that have taken place between 1959 to date within electoral management bodies (EMBs) in Nigeria shows glaringly that the problems faced by past commission continue to recur.

Allegations of bias, partiality, ineptitude and corruption levied against previous EMBs still hunt the present-day INEC. The lack of credibility in the EMBs has always been a major contributor to the bitter controversies, conflicts and violence witnessed in the conduct of election in Nigeria. But worthy of note, one major factor underpinning the lack of confidence in Nigeria's EMBs is the pattern of recruitment and deployment of adhoc electoral staff who have consistently been accused of mismanaging electoral processes.

However, the task of undertaking the conduct of a free, fair and transparent election lies in the ability of the electoral commission to effectively and efficiently manage its electoral staff. This is because the success of an organization is centered on the efficient management of its human resources who ultimately are the drivers of other resources available to the organization.

## 1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

For most developing democracies of the third world, especially Nigeria, electoral violence is not only a recurring decimal, its frequency, character and dimensions are quite freighting (Okafor, 2015).

Within this terrain the character of violence associated with the conduct of elections since 1999, resulted in several debilitating consequences. People were killed, properties destroyed, homes sacked, whole communities displaced, and incidents of kidnapping was norm. This trend of election related violence occurred in most States of the country. However, the case of Rivers State has been very worrisome considering the level of violence that characterized recent elections in the state. In particular the 2015 and rerun elections, in which several people lost their lives and unquantifiable number of properties destroyed during the period under study.


During the 2015 general elections in the state for example, an average of 19 killings took place within the five months of the election period, aside cases of people injured and wanton destruction of property (River State commission of inquiry, 2015).

The EU Election Observer Team to the election confirmed the large-scale violence that blighted the April 11, 2015 polls. It describes the March, rerun election in the State as “a War” primarily between the PDP and APC, in which those who venture out were either harassed, abducted or shot (Punch News Paper March 25, 2016).

Omololomoju (2016) points out that the violence that trailed the rerun elections in the state claimed the lives of not fewer than ten people including a member of the Nigeria Youth Service Corps. Lugman and Azizudin, (2010) raise that while the brazen use of youth-gangs as an important instrument for orchestrating political violence cut across the states in the region, the extent to which youth-gangs were deployed as instrument of political terror in Rivers State was unprecedented in Nigeria.

From a study aimed at mapping the patterns of electoral violence in Nigeria (June 2006 – May, 2014), Shamsudeen (2015) found that of 644 mortality cases due from electoral related violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of the country, Rivers State topped the charts with 181 persons meeting untimely death.

Figure 1 following depicts the rate of mortality per state in the South-South during the period.



Source: Shamsudeen, (2015, p.8)

**Figure 1**  
**Number of fatalities from Electoral Violence per State in the South-South Zone (June 2006 – May 2014)**

During the 2015 General election in the state, an average of 19 killings took place during the five months

of election period, aside the number of injuries and destruction of properties (Rivers State Commission of inquiry, 2015). A more recent case of election violence in the state is the violence that trailed the rerun state and National Assembly elections on Saturday, March 19, where not fewer than 10 people, including a member of the National Youth Service Corps, (NYSC), lost their lives (Omololomoju, 2016). The Nigeria civil society situation room report express profound disappointment in the conduct of the poll and the violence that surrounds it. The report in particular, notes the killing of NYSC Adhoc electoral staff Okonta Samuel amidst political violence at the polling unit where he was working, the abduction, assault and harassment of INEC temporary and permanent staff, and several other killings reported during the election. The tale of election violence witnessed in the state with its unpalatable consequences necessitated the choice of the state as the study area.

Bohlander and Snell (2004) argue that the idea that organizations compete through people highlights the fact that success increasingly depends on the Organization’s ability to manage its human capital.

Similarly, Armstrong (2009) explains that the overall purpose of human resource management is to ensure that an organization is able to achieve success through people.

The foregoing submissions imply that for INEC to be successful in the conduct of fair and violence-free elections, the body should be able to effectively manage its adhoc staff. Therefore, issues of the effective and efficient management of the latter is critical to the attainment of free and fair elections within the country as a whole.

Again, effective and efficient management revolve on such captions as recruitment, training, remuneration and discipline of the staff in question and the extent to which these issues are effectively addressed will determine how successful the INEC will achieve of its mandate.

The study therefore, aims at examining the configuration of management of adhoc electoral staff and the conduct of election in Rivers State in view of the wide ranging level of electoral malpractices attributable to the state during the period under review.

## 2. METHOD

The study adopts documentary review, interview technique, focus group discussion and non-participant observation were summarily employed for data collection simple while percentile assessment and chi-square were employed for data analysis.

Atkinson and Coffey refer to documents as ‘social facts’, which are produced, shared, and used in socially organized ways ((1997, p. 47).

A combination of these instruments was employed in line with Yin (1994) that a qualitative researcher is

expected to draw upon multiple sources of evidence to enable convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods. Apart from documents, such sources include interviews, participant or non-participant observation, and physical artifacts.

Eisner adds elsewhere that by triangulating data, the researcher attempts to provide *a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility* (1991, p. 110).

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It is instructive to highlight from the functionalist theoretical perspective that INEC as an institution of the political system has a major role or function to play in the restoration of social order in society through the conduct of credible and violence free election.

A plausible means of attaining this goal is to ensure the efficient performance of participating electoral staff that hold the responsibility to ensure that election protocols are efficiently managed. It is therefore appropriate to state that the interrelatedness between the pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff and election violence may be better understood under the guiding light of structural functionalism.

Functionalism or structural functionalism according to Haralambos and Holborn (2008) has its root in the works of Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820 – 1903), two of the founding fathers of sociology. It was further developed by Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) and refined by Talcott Parsons (1902 – 1979).

The driving conjecture of the functionalist theory is that society is composed of interrelated parts or units which play specific roles for the sustenance of society. It also assumes that when any part of the system is not working properly it affects all other parts, thereby creating social malfunction.

From the standpoint of structural functionalism, the basic unit of analysis is society and its various parts are understood primarily in terms of their relationship to the whole (Ekpeyong, 2012).

The relationship of the parts to the whole may be understood by analyzing their contributions or roles to the maintenance or survival of society. Consequently, the relationship is said to be functional if it promotes order or enhances the survival of the political system, and on the other hand, it is said to be dysfunctional if the possibility exists that it will reduce the chances of survival of the political system (Nnah, 2002).

Functions (according to Ake cited in Nnah, 2002) concern the consequences of a pattern of action involving objectives as well as processes, while structure refers to those arrangements which perform functions or roles. Functionalists, therefore, try to draw analogy between society and living organisms such as the human body.

Essentially, functionalists argue that just as the human

body has parts which perform certain basic functions necessary for the survival of the human body so also society comprises of parts or structures which perform specific basic roles necessary for the sustenance or maintenance of society. Again, just as certain basic needs must be satisfied if an organism is to survive, so also society faces a confrontation of basic needs which must be met to prevent its degeneration.

### 4. LITERATURE REVIEW

Several studies show that elections in Nigeria were characterized or marred by violence (Joab-Peterside, 2016, 2018; Salehyan and Linebarger, 2014; Höglund, 2009; Ojo, 2014; Onimisi, and Tinuola, 2019; Omotola, 2009; Omotola, 2010; Igwe, 2012; Omotola, 2011).

Among them Gberie (2011) cited in Oni, Chidozie and Agbudi (2013) points out that all the elections that have been conducted in Nigeria since independence have generated increasingly bitter controversies and grievances on a national scale because of the twin problems of mass violence and fraud that have become central elements of the history of elections and of the electoral process in the country.

Fadakinte argues that election crisis has always characterized every election in Nigeria and there has not been a general election since independence in 1960 that did not end in serious disputations, crises, violence and even bloodshed (2014).

Akande (2008) cited in Wordu, (2014) affirms that:

Since 1960 when Nigeria became politically independent electoral malpractices and the resultant related crisis had constituted a stumbling block to consolidation of democracy, political stability and sustainable development, rarely any election is conducted in the country without one form of violence or the other

Blander and Snell, (2004) on their part argue that the idea that organizations compete through people highlights the fact that success increasingly depends on the organization's ability to manage its human capital.

Similarly, Armstrong (2009) raises that the overall purpose of human resource management is to ensure that an organization is able to achieve success through people.

Most of the studies centered on ethnicity, religion, corruption, poverty, arms proliferation, institutional failure (INEC, police, political parties, judiciary) and the politics of oil (Ani, 2012; Ebizieim, 2015; Peterside, 2016, 2018).

These studies however, pay very little or no attention to the pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff as a major trigger of election violence despite the fact that the delivery of any good election depends on the integrity, knowledge and technical ability of the adhoc staff who are key personnel in the conduct and declaration of election results. The manner and ways they are recruited, trained, remunerated and disciplined are critical to the conduct

of a hitch free election. The conduct of every election in the state has witnessed claims and counter claims of bias by political parties against INEC on the method it adopts in recruiting its adhoc staff. Apart from the recruitment challenges, inadequacies have also been observed in the pattern of training, remuneration and discipline of adhoc staff. Most of the problems confronting the conduct of elections are traced to the activities of adhoc staff. In a statement issued by the Nigeria Civil Society Group on the general election of April 12<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>, 2003, concerns were raised bothering on recruitment, inefficiency and inadequate training of electoral personnel.

In spite of the short-comings associated with the pattern of management of adhoc staff, existing literature on the subject tend to be based on reports from Election Monitoring and Observation and not on analytical studies. Few of the studies that tend to deal with the subject only touched on it tangentially within the framework of Institutional failure (failure of the Electoral Institution). This suggests a serious gap in literature which requires further study to fill. It is against this background that this study intends to fill this gap by providing an empirical understanding of the nexus between the pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff and election violence in rivers state.

#### **4.1 Adhoc Electoral Staff and Their Duties**

According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary the term "ad hoc" is employed to describe an action necessary or expedient but unplanned in advance. It implies that a thing is created or formed to serve a specific purpose and once that is accomplished, such temporary arrangement is usually discarded.

Adhoc electoral staff according to INEC (2016) are election officials who directly handle the conduct and supervision of elections. They are recruited on temporary basis specifically for the conduct of elections and are therefore relieved of their duties once the process of conduct of elections is completed. They play very crucial roles in the electoral process and are expected by the demand of their duties to be guided by the four cardinal principles of integrity, impartiality, transparency and professionalism.

Adhoc electoral staff in Nigeria fall under five broad categories:

- Returning officers
- Collation officers
- Supervisory presiding officers
- Presiding officers
- Assistant presiding officers

Each of these categories of adhoc staff perform specific duties relating to the conduct of elections, ranging from the collation and declaration of results, conduct and supervision of conduct of polls and taking delivery of election materials etcetera.

#### **Returning Officer (RO)**

Collates (tabulates and sums up) the votes cast, announces the scores the score of Candidates and declares the winner in the election in a particular constituency.

Decides any question arising from or relating to unmarked ballots, rejected ballots, announcement of scores of candidate and the return of a winner.

#### **Collation officer (Cos)**

This staff collates and announces the votes scored by candidates at any of the levels of collation.

**Registration Area/Ward Co** – collates and announces results from Polling Units within a Registration Area (RA)/Ward.

**Local Government Area CO (LGA CO)** – collates and announces results from the various Registration Areas/Wards for the Area Council, State Assembly, Governorship, National Assembly and Presidential Elections (at the LGA level).

**State Constituency Co** – collates and announces results from all the RAs/LGAs within a State Constituency for the State Assembly Election. He shall also be the State Constituency. Returning Officers in the State House of Assembly Election.

**Federal Constituency CO** – collates and announces results from LGAs within a Federal Constituency. He/she shall also be the Federal Constituency Returning Officer in the election to the House of Representatives.

**Senatorial District CO** – collates and announces results from LGAs within a Senatorial District. He/she shall also be the Senatorial District Returning Officer in the election to the Senate.

**State CO** – collates and announces results from all LGAs within a State in the Presidential and Governorship Elections. He/she shall also be the Returning Officer in the Governorship Election.

**Chief Electoral Commissioner** – collates and announces the results from all the states of the Federation in a presidential Election and is the Returning Officer in that election. This staff is designated as the Chairman of INEC or his delegated Representative.

#### **Supervisory Presiding Officer (SPO)**

• Supervises the conduct of poll in a cluster of polling Units;

• Assists in training Poll Officials under his/her supervision;

• Ensures that all sensitive and non-sensitive election materials are available at the designated Polling Units in the right quantity and at the right time;

• Facilitates refresher training for Poll Officials at the RAC/Super RAC to perfect strategies for a smooth polling process including checking the Card Readers for operational readiness.

• Regularly visits Polling Units under his/her supervision to address issues during the period of the elections;

- Ensures that results of poll for designated Polling Units are delivered to the Collation Officer by Presiding Officers;
- Ensures the delivery of the Card Readers to the RA Collation Officer by the presiding Officer and retrieves it from him/her after collation;
- Ensures that all election materials returned to him/her by the Presiding Officers are submitted to the Electoral Officer immediately after election;
- Liaises with Security Agent to ensure that order is maintained within the Polling Units under his/her supervision;
- Is accountable to the EO in the discharge of his/her duties;
- Liaises with Polling Units and Election Operations Support Centre (EOSC)

#### **The Polling Team:**

A Polling Unit with no Voting Point comprises of:

- Presiding Officer (PO) (Ballot Paper Issuance/Overseer);
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) I (Verification and Statistics);
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) II (Register-Check/Inking);
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) III (Queue Controller);

A Polling Unit with Voting Points comprises of 4 APOs in each Voting with a Presiding Officer overseeing the polling Unit thus:

- Assistant Presiding Officer (VP) (Ballot Paper Issuance/Overseer)
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) I (verification and Statistics);
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) II (Register-Check/Inking);
- Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) III (Queue Controller);
- APO I, APO II & APO III shall work under the supervision of APO (VP).

Presiding Officer (PO) (Ballot Paper Issuance/Overseer)

Is in-charge of all activities at the Polling Unit on Election Day including Polling, Sorting, and Counting of votes as well as the Announcement of election result (s).

- 10Coordinate activities in the voting points under his supervision
- Conducts voter education ahead of polling.
- Issues ballot paper(s) to voters and ensures that voters deposit thumb-printed ballot paper(s) into the appropriate ballot box.
- Returns all election materials, other than the Result Sheets and the Card Reader, to the SPO for delivery to the EO after elections.
- Delivers the completed Result Sheets and Card Reader to the Registration Area Collation Officer (RACO)
- Reports any security incident to the Security Agents

at the Polling Unit and, where necessary, invites the Police or Security Agents to maintain order, keep the peace or arrest any person committing an offence;

- Documents adverse incidents, using incident report form and informs the appropriate authority and persons;
- Responds to calls from the EOSC for periodic updates of the elections progress and reports threats.

#### **Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) I (Verification and Statistics)**

- Work under the supervision of the PO/APO (VP).
- Assists with collection of materials from the SPO.
- Assists with the return of election materials to the SPO
- Verifies and authenticates the voter using the Card Reader;
- Fills the gender and disability status for each voter in the Voter Information and Statistics from EC 40H.

#### **Assistant Presiding Office (APO) II (Register-Check and Inking)**

- Assists with the collection of election materials from the SPO.
- Confirms that voter's details in the PVC are contained in the Register of Voters and ticks the appropriate box by the voter's name before polling.
- Applies in the preparation and sorting of the ballots.
- Assists with the return of the election materials to the SPO at the close of poll.

#### **Assistant presiding officer (APO) III (Queue Controller)**

- Ensures orderly queuing of voters
- Arranges separate queues for men and women in areas where the mingling of men and women in the same queue is not allowed

#### **Assistant Presiding Officer Voting Point, APO (VP)**

- Supervises the conduct of all activities during polling, sorting and counting within a specified Voting Point (VP).
- Acts on behalf of the PO at the Voting Point
- Regulates the conduct of voters at the VP
- Decides on all cases reported to him/her by the APO I, APO II and APO III

Below is the diagrammatic presentation of the structure of INEC Election officials comprising of both Permanent and Adhoc Staff.

### **4.2 Excerpts From Data Analysis on the Pattern of Recruitment of Adhoc Staff in Relation to Election Violence Deriving From Field Work**

Response reactions to recruitment processes of INEC adhoc staff were drawn majorly from the Human Resources Department of INEC.

Members of staff interviewed agree that advertisement for the various adhoc positions was carried out in both print and electronic media and on the notice boards of the Commission's Office at the various administrative levels. They also emphasized, that the

advertisement clearly specified the various positions to be applied for, the candidate qualification and the job specification. On whether interview was conducted to determine the suitability of the candidates for the positions applied, the interviewees answered in the negative. On the method adopted to select qualified candidates, they held that offers were made by the Commission to the Management of Nigeria Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to deploy serving Corps members to serve as adhoc staff. Specifically, respondents explained that the position of collation/ returning officers were reserved for senior academic Staff and Vice Chancellors of Universities while corps members were employed as presiding officers. The interviewees were also asked whether the pattern of recruitment of adhoc Staff contributed to the spates of violence witnessed in the conduct of elections and they answered in the negative. When they were asked whether prior checks were conducted to ascertain whether potential adhoc staff members were registered members of political parties or not, they gave passive answers.

#### **4.3 Excerpts From Data Analysis on How The Pattern of Training of Adhoc Staff Affects the Conduct of Peaceful Election.**

Respondents on this issue were of the opinion that training was conducted for adhoc staff to prepare them for the task of conducting elections. They pointed out that different categories of training were organized for the different categories of adhoc Staff. On whether the duration of training was adequate enough for the adhoc Staff to learn the processes, technicalities and skills required for the conduct of elections especially with the introduction of new facilities and equipment for conduct of elections, the Interviewees agreed that the training period was not adequate, but the Commission had to confine the training duration within the limits of available resources at its disposal.

On the issue of adequacy of training materials, respondents agreed that the materials for training were sufficient. They were however not assertive on the convenience of the training locations. On the issue of substitution of trained adhoc staff with untrained personnel for conduct of elections, the interviewees denied the claim. They however argued that where adhoc staff fail to report for election duty, they were replaced. With reference to electoral staff errors such as wrong collation etcetera respondents described such as natural human errors.

#### **4.4 Excerpts From Data Analysis on the Pattern of Remuneration of Adhoc Staff**

On the issue of whether adhoc staff were remunerated adequately, the interviewees agreed that payments were made but widely held that the amount paid may not be adequate, it was all the commission could offer within the constraints of its budgetary provisions. When they

were asked to know whether they took into consideration differences in geographical terrain where adhoc staff had to be posted for electoral duties and the likelihood of financial inducements of adhoc staff by politicians most replied in the negative adding that payments were of flat rates depending on the categories of adhoc staff. On the issue of prompt payment of allowance, the interviewees agreed that payment of allowances were promptly made. They however stated that some adhoc staff do not receive their allowance on time due to irregularities observed in their documentation. When the interviewees were asked to know whether they have received any report of adhoc staff who receive bribe from politicians in order to manipulate the result of election, they answered in the affirmative. When they were asked whether there is a correlation between the pattern of remuneration and the acceptance of bribes from politicians by adhoc staff, they were elusive in their response.

#### **4.5 Excerpts From Data Analysis on the Relationship Between Patterns of Penalties Levied on Erring Electoral Staff and Level of Electoral Fraud and Violence**

The interviewees were asked whether there were rules and regulations guiding the conduct of adhoc staff on the conduct of elections and whether the adhoc staff are aware of the existence of these rules and regulations and the penalties for violating them and they answered in the affirmative. They went further to state that during the training sessions, adhoc staff were taught the general rules and regulations guiding the conduct of elections and also provided with election manual that contains these rules and regulations as well as penalties. They were further asked to know if there had being cases of violations of these rules and regulations by adhoc staff and they answered in the affirmative. When asked to know the rate of adhoc staff violations during the period of the elections, they were unspecific. On whether those involved in electoral violations have being prosecuted and adequately punished for the offences they commit, they gave a passive answer by saying that the cases were still being investigated. The interviewees were also asked to know the possible cause(s) of the continuous electoral violations by adhoc staff despite the fact that they were aware of the penalties associated with such violations noting further that not much has being done to apply the relevant laws to punish offenders.

#### **4.6 Excerpts From Data Analysis of Focus Group Discussion**

Focus group discussions were held with selected election stakeholders from amongst political parties, the electorate and civil society organizations.

##### **Theme 1: Pattern of Recruitment of Adhoc Staff**

Respondents tended to present dissenting views on the

pattern adopted by INEC in recruiting its adhoc staff. Most however agreed that INEC advertised positions for recruitment of adhoc staff. They however differ on the actual process of selection. Some respondents faulted the recruitment process on the basis of lack of transparency, in particular respondents sympathetic to the opposition parties argued that the list of adhoc staff was manipulated by INEC in favour of the ruling party. On the contrary, the ruling party stalwarts describe the selection process as fair.

**Theme 2: Pattern of training of adhoc Staff and its effect on electoral conduct**

With reference to pattern of training of adhoc staff and its effect on the conduct of election, most respondents agreed that the pattern of training was characterized by irregularities as there was constant shifting of venues and dates for training. Participants also observed that the duration of training was inadequate for coverage of all aspects of training required for the conduct of a successful election. Some specifically faulted the substitution of trained adhoc staff with untrained personnel raising that this affected the quality of training and imparted negatively on the conduct of election. The outcome as the entire participants agreed manifested in various forms of errors witnessed in computing election results, mutilations and alterations on election materials.

**Theme 3: Pattern of Remuneration of Adhoc Staff**

Pattern of remuneration of adhoc staff raised divergent views and responses. While some of the participants especially the electorate argued that remuneration for adhoc staff was not adequate considering the level of risk associated with elections in Nigeria. Some particularly argued that the pattern of remuneration was reasonable rather the only issue adhoc staff had concerned discipline with reference to susceptibility to bribery from powerful politicians.

This resulted in some of the adhoc staff compromising the integrity of the elections with all resulting in election violence.

**Theme 4: Relationship between patterns of penalties levied on erring electoral staff and level of electoral fraud and election violence**

Most participants agreed that lack of discipline for erring adhoc staff resulted in the increase of electoral violations and election violence. Most also agreed that erring adhoc staff who perpetrate election fraud had the backing of politicians and their political parties to the extent that when they erred they were effectively protected. Within this terrain members of political parties who felt that there was no level playing field in the election process took to whatever action deemed necessary to ensure that their aspirations are met and this only heightened the nature of fraud, decay and violence.

**4.7 Test of Hypotheses**

The research hypotheses were tested using the chi-square statistical tool with a view to ascertaining the relationship between the variables of the study.

**Hypotheses 1: There seems to be a relationship between the pattern of recruitment of Adhoc Electoral Staff and Election violence**

**Table 1**  
**pattern of recruitment of Adhoc Electoral Staff and Election violence**

Respondents	SA	A	D	SD	Total
Rivers South East	159	50	37	22	268
Rivers East	163	68	46	35	312
Rivers West	79	41	30	38	188
Total	401	159	113	95	768

Source: Author’s field work, 2018.

Table 1 provides data on the opinion of respondents as to whether the pattern of recruitment of adhoc electoral staff has a relationship on Election violence in Rivers State. The data presented in the table shows that 159, 163 and 79 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, strongly agreed that There seems to be a relationship between the pattern of recruitment of adhoc electoral staff and election violence, 50 68 and 41 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, agreed; 37, 46 and 30 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively disagreed; while 22, 35 and 38 of the respondents respectively, strongly disagreed. The information presented in the Table above was further subjected to a Chi-square test for hypothesis 1 in Table 2.

**Table 2**  
**Chi-Square computation for Hypothesis 1**

Category of Respondents	O	E	O-E	(O-E)2	(O-E)2/E
Rivers South East	159	139.93	19.07	363.66	2.6
	50	55.48	-5.48	30	0.5
	37	39.43	-2.43	5.90	0.15
	22	33.15	-11.15	124.32	3.8
Rivers East	163	162.91	0.09	0.01	0.00
	68	64.59	3.41	11.63	0.18
	46	45.91	0.09	0.01	0.00
	35	38.59	-3.59	12.89	0.33
Rivers West	79	98.16	-19.16	367.11	3.74
	41	38.92	2.08	4.33	0.11
	30	27.66	2.34	5.48	0.19
	48	23.26	24.74	612.07	26.31
Chi-Square	$\chi^2=$				37.91

Source: Author’s field work, 2018.

Table 2 shows chi-square  $\chi^2$  calculated value for research hypothesis 1 as follows:

To arrive at the expected value, we multiply the total of each row by the total of each column and divide by the total number of respondents.

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o_1 - e_1)^2}{e_1}$$

Where o = Observed frequency

e = Expected frequency

At 3df, the table value of  $\chi^2$  at 0.05 level of significance



is = 12.59

Where expected value is calculated by multiplying the row total by column total for each response and dividing by total number of respondents.

Chi-square calculated value is compared with chi-square table value based on the calculated degree of freedom (df). Hence, to ascertain the degree of freedom the following formula applies.

$$\begin{aligned} df &= (R-1) (C-1) \\ &= (3-1) (4-1) \\ &= 2 \times 3 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, df = 6.

Where the accepted decision rule for the application of chi-square  $\chi^2$  test holds that we accept null hypothesis if calculated value is less than the table value and reject hypothesis if the calculated value is greater than table value – emerging calculated value for  $\chi^2$  is 37.91 while table value is 12.59, Thus, it is accepted *there appears to be a relationship between the pattern of recruitment of adhoc electoral staff and election violence.*

Again, since the margin between the computed  $\chi^2$  value is significantly higher than the table value, it is safe to make the submission that the pattern of recruitment of adhoc electoral staff influences election violence in Rivers State.

**Hypotheses 2: Inadequate training of Adhoc Electoral Staff tends to increase the rate of Electoral Staff errors and Election violence.**

**Table 3**  
**Inadequate training of Adhoc Electoral Staff tends to increase the rate of Electoral Staff errors and Election violence**

Respondents	SA	A	D	SD	Total
Rivers South East	175	40	31	19	265
Rivers East	153	56	46	35	290
Rivers West	113	41	30	29	213
Total	441	137	107	83	768

Source: Author’s field work, 2018.

Table 3 provides data on the opinion of respondents as to whether the inadequate training of adhoc electoral staff tends to increase the rate of electoral staff errors and election violence. The data presented in the table shows that 175, 153 and 131 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, strongly agreed that inadequate training of Adhoc Electoral staff tends to increase the rate of Electoral Staff errors and Election violence, 40, 56 and 41 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, agreed; 31, 46 and 29 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively disagreed; while 19, 35 and 29 of the respondents respectively, strongly disagreed that inadequate training of Adhoc Electoral staff tends to increase the rate of Electoral Staff errors and Election violence. The information presented in the Table above

was further subjected to a Chi-square test for hypothesis 2 in Table 4.

**Table 4**  
**Chi-Square computation for Hypothesis 2**

Category of Respondents	O	E	O-E	(O-E)2	(O-E)2/E
Rivers South East	175	152.17	22.83	521.21	3.43
	40	47.27	-7.27	52.85	1.12
	31	36.92	-5.92	35.05	0.95
	19	28.64	-9.64	92.92	3.24
Rivers East	153	166.52	-13.52	182.79	1.09
	56	51.73	4.27	18.23	0.35
	46	40.40	5.6	31.36	0.78
	35	31.34	3.66	13.39	0.43
Rivers West	113	122.31	-9.31	86.68	0.71
	41	37.99	3.01	9.06	0.24
	30	29.68	0.32	0.10	0.00
	29	23.02	5.98	35.76	1.55
Chi-Square	$\chi^2=$				14.05

Source: Author’s field work, 2018.

Table 4 shows chi-square  $\chi^2$  calculated value for research hypothesis 1 as follows:

To arrive at the expected value, we multiply the total of each row by the total of each column and divide by the total number of respondents.

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o_1 - e_1)^2}{e_1}$$

Where o = Observed frequency

e = Expected frequency

At 3df, the table value of  $\chi^2$  at 0.05 level of significance is = 12.59

Note that expected value is calculated by multiplying the row total by column total for each response and dividing by total number of respondents.

After this, chi-square calculated value is compared with chi-square table value based on the calculated degree of freedom (df). Hence, to ascertain the degree of freedom the following formula applies.

$$\begin{aligned} df &= (R-1) (C-1) \\ &= (3-1) (4-1) \\ &= 2 \times 3 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, df = 6.

Where the generally accepted decision rule for the application of chi-square  $\chi^2$  test states that we accept null hypothesis if calculated value is less than the table value and reject hypothesis if the calculated value is greater than table value. In this study, since calculated value for  $\chi^2$  is 14.05 and table value is 12.59, the hypothesis which states that *Inadequate training of adhoc electoral staff tends to increase the rate of electoral staff errors and election violence* is accepted.

Again, since the margin between the computed  $\chi^2$  value is significantly higher than the table value, it is safe to make the submission that *inadequate training of adhoc electoral staff tends to increase the rate of electoral staff errors and election violence.*

**Hypotheses 3: Inadequate remuneration of Adhoc Electoral Staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence.**

**Table 5**  
**Inadequate remuneration of Adhoc Electoral Staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence**

Respondents	SA	A	D	SD	Total
Rivers South East	169	22	31	19	241
Rivers East	162	56	38	35	291
Rivers West	140	41	26	29	236
Total	471	119	95	83	768

Source: Author's field work, 2018.

Table 5 provides data on the opinion of respondents to whether inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence. The data presented in the table shows that 169, 162 and 140 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, strongly agreed that inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence. It was followed by 22, 56 and 41 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, who agreed inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence. 31, 38 and 29 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively disagreed; while 19, 35 and 29 of the respondents respectively, strongly disagreed that Inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence. The information presented in the Table above was further subjected to a Chi-square test for hypothesis 3 in Table 6.

**Table 6**  
**Chi-Square computation for Hypothesis 3**

Category of Respondents	O	E	O-E	(O-E)2	(O-E)2/E
Rivers South East	169	147.80	21.2	449.44	3.04
	22	37.34	-15.34	235.32	16.30
	31	29.81	-1.19	1.42	0.05
	19	26.05	-7.05	49.70	1.91
Rivers East	163	178.46	-15.46	239.01	1.34
	56	45.09	10.91	119.03	2.64
	38	35.99	2.01	4.04	0.11
	35	31.45	3.55	12.60	0.40
Rivers West	140	144.73	-4.73	22.37	0.15
	41	36.57	4.43	19.62	0.54
	26	29.19	-3.19	10.18	0.35
	29	25.51	3.49	12.18	0.48
Chi-Square	$\chi^2=$				27.31

Source: Author's field work, 2018.

Table 6 shows chi-square  $\chi^2$  calculated value for research hypothesis 1 as follows:

To arrive at the expected value, we multiply the total of each row by the total of each column and divide by the total number of respondents.

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o_1 - e_1)^2}{e_1}$$

Where o = Observed frequency

e = Expected frequency

At 3df, the value of  $\chi^2$  at 0.05 level of significance is = 12.59

Note that expected value is calculated by multiplying the row total by column total for each response and dividing by total number of respondents.

After this, chi-square calculated value is compared with chi-square table value based on the calculated degree of freedom (df). Hence, to ascertain the degree of freedom the following formula applies.

$$\begin{aligned} df &= (R-1)(C-1) \\ &= (3-1)(4-1) \\ &= 2 \times 3 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, df = 6.

Where the generally accepted decision rule for the application of chi-square  $\chi^2$  test states that we accept null hypothesis if calculated value is less than the table value and reject hypothesis if the calculated value is greater than table value. In this study, since calculated value for  $\chi^2$  is 14.05 and table value is 12.59, the hypothesis which states that *inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence* is accepted.

Again, since the margin between the computed  $\chi^2$  value is significantly higher than the table value, it is safe to make the submission that *inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence*.

**Hypotheses 4: Lack of discipline for erring Adhoc Electoral Staff is likely to increase the level of Electoral violations and Electoral violence.**

**Table 7**  
**Lack of discipline for erring Adhoc Electoral Staff is likely to increase the level of Electoral violations and Electoral violence**

Respondents	SA	A	D	SD	Total
Rivers South East	160	21	37	21	239
Rivers East	171	50	39	27	287
Rivers West	140	41	32	29	242
Total	471	112	108	77	768

Source: Author's field work, 2018.

Table 7 provides data on the opinion of respondents to whether inadequate remuneration of adhoc electoral staff is likely to lead to electoral fraud and election violence. The data presented in the table shows that 160, 171 and 140 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, strongly agreed that Lack of discipline for erring adhoc electoral staff is likely to increase the level of Electoral violations and

Electoral violence. It was followed by 21, 50 and 41 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively, who agreed lack of discipline for erring adhoc electoral staff is likely to increase the level of electoral violations and electoral violence. 37, 39 and 32 of the respondents from Rivers South East, Rivers East and Rivers West respectively disagreed; while 21, 27 and 29 of the respondents respectively, strongly disagreed that Lack of discipline for erring adhoc electoral staff is likely to increase the level of Electoral violations and Electoral violence. The information presented in the Table above was further subjected to a Chi-square test for hypothesis 3 in Table 8.

**Table 8**  
**Chi-Square computation for Hypothesis 4**

Category of Respondents	O	E	O-E	(O-E) <sup>2</sup>	(O-E) <sup>2</sup> /E
	160	146.57	13.43	180.36	1.23
Rivers South East	21	34.85	-13.58	184.42	5.29
	37	33.61	3.39	11.49	0.34
	21	23.06	-2.06	4.24	0.18
	171	171.98	-0.98	0.96	0.01
Rivers East	50	41.84	8.16	66.59	1.59
	39	40.36	-1.36	1.85	0.05
	27	28.77	1.77	3.13	0.04
	140	148.41	-8.41	70.73	0.48
Rivers West	41	35.29	5.71	32.60	0.92
	32	34.03	2.03	4.12	0.12
	29	24.26	4.74	22.47	0.93
Chi-Square	$\chi^2 =$				13.18

Source: Author's field work, 2018.

The Table 8 shows chi-square  $\chi^2$  calculated value for research hypothesis 1 as follows:

To arrive at the expected value, we multiply the total of each row by the total of each column and divide by the total number of respondents.

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o_1 - e_1)^2}{e_1}$$

Where o = Observed frequency  
e = Expected frequency

At 3df, the table value of  $\chi^2$  at 0.05 level of significance is = 12.59

Note that expected value is calculated by multiplying the row total by column total for each response and dividing by total number of respondents.

Chi-square calculated value is compared with chi-square table value based on the calculated degree of freedom (df). Hence, to ascertain the degree of freedom the following formula applies.

$$\begin{aligned} df &= (R-1)(C-1) \\ &= (3-1)(4-1) \\ &= 2 \times 3 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, df = 6.

Where the generally accepted decision rule for the application of chi-square  $\chi^2$  test states that we accept null hypothesis if calculated value is less than the table value

and reject hypothesis if the calculated value is greater than table value. In this study, since calculated value for  $\chi^2$  is 13.18 and table value is 12.59, the hypothesis which states that *Lack of discipline for erring adhoc electoral staff is likely to increase the level of electoral violations and electoral violence* is accepted.

Again, since the margin between the computed  $\chi^2$  value is significantly higher than the table value, it is safe to make the submission that *lack of discipline for erring adhoc electoral staff is likely to increase the level of electoral violations and electoral violence*

#### 4.8 Discussion of Findings

Regarding the pattern adopted by INEC in the recruitment of adhoc electoral staff, the findings of the study also show that majority of respondents disagreed that the method of selection of candidates was based purely on merit, rather they said recruitment was based on political consideration and in most cases selection was done without much regard to educational qualification and technical ability of the candidates. This assertion clearly corroborates Dode's view (in Kunle and obiyan, 2012) that past elections conducted in Nigeria by Election Management Bodies (EMBs) have shown that apart from few competent and credible adhoc staff picked to conduct previous elections, majority were incompetent, unemployed or party agents and because of their weak background, majority of these elements were easily recruited by desperate politicians to serve as election riggers at a fee.

In addition, some trained adhoc Staff were deliberately substituted with those not trained leading to protest and violence. This constituted a huge challenge to the conduct of a hitch free election. This finding agrees with the position of Nwosu (2016) that during the 2003-2011 election in Nigeria several people alleged that they have been trained but were later replaced by party representatives or relations of Permanent staff of INEC.

Findings of the study on the relationship between the pattern of training of adhoc Staff and election violence indicated that though training was conducted for adhoc staff on the conduct of election, the training was inadequate for the conduct of a hitch free election due largely to insufficient training duration, inconvenient training location that hinders effective teaching and learning and the haphazard nature of the training arrangement, ranging from difficulty in locating venues, and most dangerously, substitution of shortlisted trainee at the venue of training with those not shortlisted.

Again, findings of the study also show that the training of adhoc staff was carried out within a period of three days. The short period of training was not adequate for the adhoc staff to learn all the intricacies and technicalities involved in the conduct of the election especially with the introduction of new technologies like the use of smart card readers for accreditation of voters. This finding is line with the finding of the report of the Registration

and Election Review Committee (2012) which clearly highlighted that from the overall assessment of the process of training of adhoc staff during the conduct of the 2011 general election there was inadequate time for adhoc staff training hence the need for adequate training and retraining for all staff especially adhoc staff.

From this study inadequate training resulted in collation errors, wrong collation of data and manipulation of election result leading to protest and violence.

With reference to inadequate remuneration leading to electoral fraud and election violence, findings here show that poor remuneration of adhoc staff and irregularities associated with the pattern of payment make them vulnerable to electoral fraud thus creating the enabling environment for violence.

From the findings some of the adhoc staff were not paid their allowance while some had delays in payment of their allowance due largely to delay in submission of bank details, irregularities in their bank details and in some cases, controversies arising from the mode of recruitment of the affected adhoc staff especially, in cases where substitution was made without proper documentation. For instance, it was discovered that some adhoc staff were substituted at the polling unit on election day which obviously caused delay in the process of formalizing their appointment and processing their payment details.

On the issue of adequate allowance to adhoc staff the study found dissatisfaction with the amount paid as allowance. Most of them lamented that the amount paid was not adequate considering the risk involved in their assignment. It was also discovered that adhoc staff with similar job description were paid same amount without considering the differences in the geographical terrain where they had to work. This contributed to why some adhoc staff failed to promptly report at their place of duty especially those posted to the riverine areas leading to unpremeditated substitution in some cases.

Findings of the study also indicate that most of the adhoc staff arrived at their duty post without any stipend on them to cater for their feeding hence they became susceptible to monetary advances from politicians. These findings are in tandem with the RERC report, 2012 on the conduct of the 2011 general election where it was expressly stated that "there were many problems concerning the issue of remuneration of adhoc staff as there was wide spread opinion of stakeholders from RERC's field consultation that allowances were badly paid and payments were allegedly not made promptly.

On the issue of whether the lack of discipline for erring adhoc staff is likely to increase the level of electoral violations and electoral violence, findings of the study indicates that majority of adhoc staff who were involved in electoral offences were not punished or prosecuted and the absence of punishment for erring adhoc staff served as incentive for engaging in more electoral violations all of which provided the trigger for violence.

Nature of electoral fraud ranged from connivance with politicians to manipulate the outcome of elections resulting in election disputes and violence, accepting gratification or bribes from politicians, stuffing of ballot boxes with already thumb printed ballot papers even before commencement of voting; incorrect collation; abandonment of authorized voting and collation center to undisclosed location; commencement of voting without accreditation, intentional missing of result sheets etcetera.

Findings of the study also revealed that some of the acclaimed adhoc staff were card carrying members of political parties who flouted most of the electoral regulations in order to manipulate the outcome of the election in favour of their preferred political party.

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## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

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Based on the findings and conclusion reached in this study, the following recommendations have been proffered to mitigate reoccurrence of fraud and violence in future elections:

- The process of recruitment of adhoc electoral staff should be transparently based on merit. Experience in electoral duties, political neutrality and competence of the applicants should be the criteria for recruitment and not political affiliations.
- To further promote transparency in the recruitment process names of shortlisted or selected adhoc staff should be displayed or advertised in major newspapers for public scrutiny to ensure that card carrying members of political parties.
- To avoid compromising integrity, recruited adhoc staff should be subjected to a systematically planned and intensive training programme that should span for a week or two to allow for adequate coverage of all aspects of the conduct of elections.
  - Only trained adhoc staff should be deployed for the conduct of elections.
  - The remuneration of adhoc staff should be adequately enhanced and paid promptly while logistics should be put in place to ensure that on election day, adhoc staff are provided with feeding allowances to cater for their feeding so as not to make them susceptible to monetary advances from politicians
  - Erring electoral Staff should be adequately sanctioned and be made to face disciplinary measures as enshrined in the relevant laws and regulations guiding the conduct of election so as to serve as deterrent to others who may wish to commit similar offences.

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## 6. CONCLUSION

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The pattern of management of adhoc electoral staff contributed to rise in the rate of election violence in Rivers State owing to inadequacies as to the manner they were recruited, trained, remunerated and disciplined.

There was evident relationship between the pattern of recruitment of adhoc staff and election violence in Rivers State. The recruitment process lacked the desired transparency needed to ensure that candidates are selected based on merit and not on any other consideration. The use of party loyalist for conduct of the election resulted into protests and violence.

Inadequate training of adhoc staff also increased the rate of electoral staff errors and election violence in the state. The short duration of training of adhoc staff and substitution of trainees with untrained personnel contributed to cases of collation errors resulting into declaration of faulty election results and election violence.

There is a relationship between the pattern of remuneration of adhoc electoral staff and election violence. Inadequate remuneration and delay in payment of allowances makes them susceptible to monetary advances and manipulation by politicians thus creating the enabling environment for violence.

Erring adhoc electoral staff were not given adequate punishment for committing electoral violations/offences. Lack of adequate punishment for erring adhoc staff therefore serves as incentive for more electoral violations leading to electoral disputes and violence.

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